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Executive Summary 
This report examines the EU agenda on security technology. It questions whether security and 
defence or internal and external security have largely merged since the end of the Cold War so that 
there is no longer any significant difference between user needs, technologies and suppliers. This 
belief has underpinned a variety of policy actions on security and defence technologies and 
industry spearheaded by the European Commission over the last decade. The report considers 
whether the conceptual blurring of the concepts of defence and security in academic and policy 
literature is in fact matched in the policy reality. It concludes that there are still significant 
differences particularly in terms of end user requirements, although there is overlap in terms of 
both technologies and suppliers. 
The Commission’s policy activism in developing EU policy on security industry and technology has 
gone largely unnoticed. The report aims to define the scope of this market and the types of 
technologies used. It also evaluates the policy actions taken by the EU to improve the 
competitiveness of EU security and defence industry. This means the report offers a clear overview 
of a complex developing sector. It argues that the emergence of homeland security raises difficult 
ethical questions inside the EU about the correct balance between civil rights and security, which 
are highlighted by the types of technologies emerging from the EU security research priority in the 
7th Framework Programme. However, another pressing issue, highlighted by the Arab Spring, is 
whether the EU has sufficient control over the export of these technologies to repressive regimes, 
as numerous media reports showed how surveillance technologies and other policing equipment 
were used to repress political dissidents. The report outlines existing control mechanisms and their 
weaknesses and evaluates the possibilities for improving control measures in the future. 
 
About the author 
Dr Jocelyn Mawdsley is a lecturer in European and EU Politics at the University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne in the UK. She has published widely on European armaments issues, most recently on Franco-
British defence relations and on the growth of the homeland security industrial sector. Her current 
research concentrates on security technologies and export controls, large states and the CSDP and 
interpretivism in security studies. She is also coordinating a collaborative research network on 
CSDP Strategy.   
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1 Introduction
I
 
1.1 Research Questions 
Since the emergence of the modern state system in Europe, security threats have been 
predominantly defined as external military threats, and the armed forces have been configured 
accordingly. This external focus, combined with the Weberian principle that the state should have 
the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, meant that the military domain was largely 
immune from the hollowing out of the state seen in other areas of governance. Since the end of 
the Cold War however, the role of the European military has changed considerably in response to 
changing definitions of security threats (the broadening and deepening of the security agenda), and 
there is much greater private sector involvement in security tasks meaning the line dividing civilian 
and military tasks has been blurred. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks opened up the field of internal security, particularly in the US, but also 
elsewhere. The desire on the part of governments to make citizens and critical infrastructure safe 
from any terrorist threat has led to the emergence of a global homeland security market as new 
technology requirements emerged. Within the EU, the complex treaty basis for action in the 
security domain has meant that the policy dynamics surrounding this development are not entirely 
straightforward. According to Edler and James (2012) the European Commission has acted as a 
policy entrepreneur to drive an agenda on homeland security technology development, which did 
not have full buy-in from either the member states or industry. The conceptual blurring in the 
security domain described above has allowed the ambiguous terms security industry and security 
technology to be elided with defence industry and defence technology, where the Commission’s 
legal mandate is far from clear. The question is whether this blurring is now an accurate reflection 
of reality. Or can the civilian and military technologies and their industrial suppliers and customers 
still be differentiated? 
The EU agenda on security technology begs an initial question of whether it remains possible to 
differentiate between internal and external security, military and civilian, and security and defence 
in the 21st century but also sparks a number of sub-questions. It is these sub-questions that drive 
the structure of the report: 
− How has the concept of security changed in the post Cold War era? And how has this been 
interpreted in the EU? 
− What is the security market? What are the parameters that determine its technologies and 
supply and demand side? Can these be differentiated from the more established defence 
technologies, firms and customers / users? 
− What are the European policy initiatives in this area and what is driving them? What impact are 
they having on the market? Who are the policy entrepreneurs – the EU institutions or the 
member states? Are the different policy aims coherent?  Is it beneficial or problematic to 
conflate defence and security? What impact do the security industrial and technological issues 
have on other EU policies? 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The author would like to thank Ulpia Botezatu, a PhD candidate at Newcastle University, for her enthusiasm for and highly 
capable research assistance with this project. 
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− Finally, the place of security technologies in the strategic export control system needs analysis. 
Do existing regimes cover security technologies? Should security technologies be controlled? 
What are the ethical issues? 
1.2 Methodology 
In order to investigate the research questions a variety of qualitative research methods were used. 
The rationale for selecting qualitative methods rather than quantitative ones was purely pragmatic. 
As the introduction to section 3 of the report will show, there are major problems with reliable 
data availability. Comparable national data, for example, exists for defence research spending but 
not for security research. This in turn substantially limits the type of quantitative analysis that can 
be carried out. 
As Edler and James (2012) argue there has also been comparatively little academic research carried 
out on this topic and so much of the analysis refers to primary documents rather than secondary 
studies. The report also draws heavily on semi-official publications and studies carried out by 
members of the policy and advocacy communities. In addition to the use of official documents and 
grey literature, sections 3, 4 and 5 drew on a series of semi-structured interviews carried out in 
April 2008 (funded by the British Academy) and January 2012. Interviews were carried out in both 
cases with European Commission, European Parliament and European Defence Agency officials as 
well as with industry representatives. The initial round of interviews were carried out in 2008, 
shortly after the first tranches of funding had been allocated in the Security Research priority of the 
Seventh Framework Programme, the first major EU action connected to security industry, and 
aimed to discover what the industrial policy aims were, how they fitted with wider EU policies, and 
how they were initially received by other institutions, user groups and industry. The second round 
of interviews tried to elicit perspectives from all groups involved on whether they felt EU initiatives 
supporting the security industry had been successful, the extent to which they had contributed or 
would contribute to wider policy aims and to industrial competitiveness, and how interviewees 
viewed proposed future actions. In some cases, it was possible to re-interview the original 
interviewee, but in most cases individuals had moved to new posts, responsibilities had been 
reallocated or the agenda had moved in a different direction, making a different person more 
important to meet.  In this report, the interviewees are not identified by name or job title, but 
rather by institution or sector, in order to preserve the confidentiality that many interviewed 
requested. Section 5 also draws on a series of telephone interviews carried out with experts on 
export controls carried out between May and July 2012. These aimed to scope out the current 
debate on the control of security technologies and the preferred methods for doing so rather than 
to provide specific information. Finally, section four includes an evaluation of the security research 
programme. To evaluate whether critical reports were accurate in their claims, a database of 
projects funded before July 2012 was created and used for analysis. 
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1.3 Structure of Report 
The report starts with a literature review to consider how and why the concepts of security and 
defence, internal and external security and civilian and military seem increasingly intertwined. It 
begins with an overview of key academic and practitioner attempts to reconceptualise the notion 
of security in response to the challenges of the post Cold War era. It moves on to consider the 
emergence of the concept of homeland security and questions whether it is possible to 
differentiate between European and US understandings and practices in this field. Finally, it offers a 
brief overview of the particular usage of these concepts within the EU and the reasons why practice 
may be different in this arena than elsewhere. This section is conceptual in nature. 
The second substantive section aims to elucidate whether or not there has been a blurring of the 
boundaries between security and defence, internal and external security and civilian and military as 
far as industry, technology and user groups are concerned. The research attempts in particular to 
clarify what the European Commission understands to be security industry, technologies and 
customers and whether this is identical to their understanding of defence counterparts. It also 
looks at the way in which the supply and demand side have responded to the security field as 
understood by the Commission. 
The third substantive section offers an evaluation of the different policy initiatives within Europe 
which aim to improve the competitiveness of security and defence industries and foster 
technological development in the field and questions whether there is a coherent approach. After 
outlining the legal basis for EU action in this sphere and its limits, the section critically assesses EU 
security research funding, security and defence industrial policy, homeland or internal security 
policies and the intergovernmental work of the European Defence Agency. It then looks at bilateral, 
multilateral and NATO cooperation in this area and evaluates their ability to contribute to or 
disrupt EU policy. It ends by questioning the tendency within the EU to overstate the convergence 
between security and defence and asking whether both the supply and demand side would benefit 
from a more differentiated approach. 
The final substantive section looks at the impact of security technologies on the arms export 
control agenda. It outlines why the export of certain technologies has become problematic. It then 
questions whether framing the debate in the same terms as the arms export control debate is 
productive. It offers an overview of existing controls within various regimes and discusses potential 
amendments to these regimes to improve the situation. Finally, it discusses the disjuncture 
between the desire to control some of these technologies on human rights grounds and the 
external requirements of the EU’s internal security priorities. 
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2 Security and Defence: Concepts and 
Usage 
2.1 Introduction 
When discussing matters of security and defence, it is widely agreed that both academics and 
policy practitioners find it increasingly difficult to pinpoint what it means to be secure in the 
contemporary environment. This brief conceptual overview attempts to map the relevant debates 
to show how and why it can be argued that there has been a blurring of the concepts of internal 
and external security, civilian and military and security and defence. The clear national military 
threat definitions of the Cold War era have been replaced by a myriad of transnational security 
challenges (many of which require international cooperation because of their nature), changing 
understandings of the appropriate roles for the armed forces and other security providers, and the 
hollowing out of the nation state in security provision, through both privatisation and changing 
modes of governance. The issue is complicated further within the European Union because of 
overlapping institutional competences and rivalries. 
This review section will first review the key academic and practitioner responses to the post Cold 
War challenges to the definition of security purely in terms of external military threat to a nation 
state. It will go on to outline the emergence of the concept of homeland security and look at 
whether the EU and US have converging or diverging agendas and approaches. The third section 
will look at the EU member states and pinpoint different practices in the area of internal security. 
The final substantive section will look at the EU itself and the ways in which the concepts of 
security and defence are used in policymaking.  
2.2 Changing Academic and Practitioner 
Understandings of Security: Broadening and 
Deepening 
2.2.1   The Concept of National Security / Defence in the Cold War 
It is perhaps a myth that there was a clear understanding of what national security was during the 
Cold War. The predominance of realism as an explanatory framework for state behaviour in the 
world within both practitioner and academic Cold War circles, allowed policymakers to make the 
assumption that states act rationally to maximise their interests while prioritising state survival. But 
even during the Cold War security decisions were made that were not based entirely on rational 
calculations of national interests. If, as Katzenstein (1996: 2) points out, the Cold War is understood 
solely as a “bipolar, ideological struggle”, then the question of a more complicated understanding 
of national security can be avoided, but if the Cold War’s complexities are considered more 
thoroughly, similar issues regarding norms, identities and interests emerge to those identified in 
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the post-Cold War era. That said, it is of course true that there was a clear military threat evident 
during the Cold War and this took priority over any other security concerns for most European 
states. After the conflicts leading to decolonisation had ended, only where domestic terrorism was 
prolonged and serious, were substantial resources diverted from the main security concern of the 
East-West confrontation.  
It is necessary for this study to discuss the genesis and concept of national security. The concept of 
national security was developed most overtly in the United States. First emerging in documents 
surrounding the US entry into World War I, the concept came to the fore in US government in the 
aftermath of World War II as a means of distinguishing between national defence (viewed as the 
activities of the armed forces) and security, which was seen to encompass the nation’s entire 
capacity for war including matters such as industry, research and resources (Relyea, 2002).  As far 
as academia was concerned, Wolfers (1952) is generally credited with developing a definition of 
what national security was understood to mean, by suggesting it marked a prioritisation of the 
security of the nation over that of the wider international community. More broadly it was defined 
as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats. Although it is often 
assumed that national security was an universally understood academic concept during the Cold 
War in fact, as Baldwin (1997) points out academic publications tended to avoid definitions, 
enabling Buzan (1991) to bemoan the lack of conceptual work on security prior to the 1980s, and 
the continuing neglect of this issue. 
The centrality of the East-West confrontation to global security policy, and the crucial role of both 
nuclear weapons and the large standing armies stationed in East and West Germany in the conflict, 
meant that security was also defined through the prism of armed forces and their weaponry. The 
central concepts of Cold War analysis were the balance of power, bipolarity, containment and 
deterrence. This concentration on hard security for the nation state, and the resources needed to 
supply it, also constricted academics and practitioners from thinking more broadly or idealistically 
about global security. The end of the Cold War and the lack of a clear successor in terms of military 
threat however opened up space to reconceptualise security. Within this debate two main strands 
were discernible; the broadening of the national security agenda to include non-military threats, 
and the deepening of the security agenda to consider the security of individuals not just states. 
2.2.2   New Security Concerns – the Broadening Agenda 
The broadening of the security agenda has been predominantly associated in academia with neo-
realistsI, who accepted the need to move beyond purely military threats to state integrity. Ullman 
(1983) was one of the first to critique the concentration on external military threats, pointing out 
that this risked both ignoring non-military threats with the power to destabilise states and 
underestimating threats from within. Ullman argued that:  
“a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and 
over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) 
threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state 
or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state” (1983: 
133). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The deepening agenda is associated more with social constructivist and critical theorist scholars, while the Copenhagen School 
advocated a parallel broadening and deepening agenda. 
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Following on from this, scholars have suggested different types of threat that should be categorised 
as security threats. The Copenhagen School, for example, identifies five general categories or 
sectors of security; military, environmental, economic, societal and political security (Buzan et al, 
1998). Migration, international terrorism and environmental degradation have become standard 
chapters in security studies textbooks.  
However, the broadening of the security agenda is not without its critics. Some, like Ayoob (1997), 
argue that broadened definitions of security just obfuscate issues and confuse the discussion of 
security, and that it is therefore unhelpful to conflate problems of global management with 
international security. A more serious critique is outlined by proponents of securitisation theory; 
here it is suggested that by defining an issue as a security issue through speech acts, politicians can 
claim the need for extraordinary measures to block the threat (Buzan et al, 1998). Bigo (2002) 
suggests, further to the Copenhagen School, that securitisation is not just about speech acts, but 
also about the particular practices of security professionals that securitisation allows to be applied 
to the threat, which may endanger human rights. As this review will show later, this critique is 
particularly applicable to the field of homeland security. 
2.2.3   Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect – the Deepening 
Agenda 
The deepening agenda in academic security studies has focussed on challenging the state as the 
referent object of security; that is the thing to be secured. The question is whether entities other 
than the state should be able to claim security threats that need to be dealt with. While authors 
have proposed moving upwards to the level of the international, and downwards to regional and 
societal levels, the argument that has gained most attention in the academic and practitioner 
worlds is that of human security; the security threats to the individual. This is not to replace the 
broadening agenda: if one considers referent objects other than the state, it rapidly becomes clear 
that existential threats extend far beyond military threats. As the 1993 Human Development 
Report pointed out:  
"The concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much 
greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human 
development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security" (UNDP 
Human Development Report 1993: 2). 
 
The UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report developed this theme further arguing that freedom 
from fear and want for all individuals was the best way to tackle global insecurity outlining seven 
sources of insecurity (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political 
security). These arguments attracted a lot of attention from academics and policy practitioners and 
were considered key to two policy developments: the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines and the 
development of the responsibility to protect guidelines for humanitarian intervention. 
It is this latter development that is most important for this report, as it had a profound impact on 
how the EU began to think about a military role. Briefly, in 2001 the Canadian government 
sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to look at 
the question posed by Kofi Annan about how the UN should respond to atrocities like Rwanda and 
Srebrenica if humanitarian intervention was an unacceptable assault on state sovereignty. The 
ICISS (2001) concluded that the right to humanitarian intervention could be exercised, because the 
right to security of the individual can override that of the state, if the individuals are being 
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threatened internally by their own state or externally by other states. They also argued that it was 
vital to understand and address the root causes of instability and that prevention was better than 
intervention. ICISS (2001) agreed though on six criteria for military intervention to be permissible, 
namely; right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable 
prospects. The concept of intervention was later adopted by the UN with respect to genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Military intervention remains 
controversial and UN inconsistency in its use has been criticised. Moreover, some critics like 
Chandler (2008) claim that the human security agenda has led to an exaggeration of post-Cold War 
security threats, located them in the developing world with negative consequences for 
development policy, and in the developed world encouraged short term interventionism rather 
than long term strategic thinking.I 
2.2.4   Consequences for Policy  
There have been a variety of consequences of these debates for policy. Firstly, the shift away from 
viewing security through the prism of external military threats to the integrity of the nation state 
has changed the way in which European states, and the EU, define threats and how to deal with 
them. The EU Security Strategy, for example, identifies five key threats to EU security: terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime 
(European Council, 2003). These require very different security policies than were prevalent during 
the Cold War, and where military force is to be used, it demands differently trained, armed and 
configured armed forces.  Secondly, the human security agenda’s more holistic approach to conflict 
intervention at all stages has meant different types of actors, both public and private, becoming 
involved in interventions. This has led to a blurring of the previously fairly distinct lines between 
civilian and military categories. 
Moreover, those academics with concerns about the securitisation of a large array of challenges as 
security threats have their counterparts in policy-making. If academics were quick to identify new 
security threats, policymakers have been equally as quick to follow suit. Increasingly the EU talks in 
terms of security across a bewildering array of policy fields. We have policies, committees and 
legislation on aviation security, border security, energy security, environmental security, food 
security, health security and social security to list just some. Perhaps the concerns about the 
legitimisation of extraordinary measures through the definition of a challenge as a security threat 
are most obvious in the area of homeland security. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The EU’s CSDP missions have been criticised, for example, for the lack of strategic rationale (Flechtner, 2006). 
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2.3 The Concept of Homeland Security 
2.3.1   Genesis 
The term homeland security is often credited to President George W Bush for a speech he made 
shortly after the 9/11 attacks. However, homeland security was a concept used in the late 1990s by 
military analysts working on post-Cold War US security policy, who had labelled it a primary 
security concern – the 2000 report from the United States National Commission of Security in the 
21st Century recommended for example that the USA needed to develop improved homeland 
security capabilities given the threat of terrorism (2000: 14). Cohen et al (2006) argued that at that 
stage there were three main problems with the US homeland or internal security status quo; firstly, 
the massive fragmentation of internal security responsibilities was tolerated to avoid centralisation, 
secondly, that the agencies charged with homeland security functions almost invariably had other 
primary responsibilities, and thirdly, that coordination between agencies was not always sufficient. 
Following the 9/11 attacks there were rapid attempts to solve these problems with the creation of 
first an Office and then a Department for Homeland Security and the appointment of a Homeland 
Security Advisor to coordinate activity. The PATRIOT Act of October 2001, which removed many 
restrictions on law enforcement, intelligence and immigration officials’ activities to monitor the 
activities of citizens and non-citizens, became very much associated with the homeland security 
concept. 
Morag (2011) suggests that homeland security is a uniquely American concept and “is a product of 
American geographic isolation and the strong tendency throughout American history to believe that 
there was a clear divide between events, issues, and problems outside US borders and those inside 
US borders” (Morag, 2011: 1). Morag (2011) argues that unlike its allies, the USA had traditionally 
made a clear distinction between the tools it was able to deploy abroad and those it could at home, 
meaning that national security techniques could not legally or institutionally be applied on US 
territory. Homeland Security was an attempt to bridge this divide. It was intended to be an 
integrative concept that brought together preparedness, response and recovery to any event that 
could cause massive social and economic disruption. Critics view it as an authoritarian security 
state. Nevertheless, the need to respond to the US homeland security agenda has led to the 
adoption of the terminology elsewhere without, according to Morag (2011), a clear understanding 
of the concept. 
Morag’s (2011) suggestion that the US’s allies have adopted homeland security terminology 
without understanding the concept needs though to be set against the lack of conceptual clarity in 
the USA itself. Bellavita (2008: 1-2), for example, suggests that there are at least seven defensible 
definitions:  
− a concerted national (federal, state and local) counterterrorism effort;  
− a concerted national effort on counterterrorism and protection, response and recovery from 
manmade and natural hazards;  
− what the Department of Homeland Security does to prevent, respond to and recover from 
terrorism and catastrophes;  
− a locally directed effort to prevent and prepare for incidents likely to threaten citizens’ safety 
and security; 
− a national effort to prevent or mitigate any social trend or threat that might endanger the 
stability of the American way of life; 
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− an element of national security or 
− a symbol used by government to justify the curtailment of civil liberties. 
This strongly suggests that homeland security in the US is far from being accepted as an integrative 
concept. The Department for Homeland Security has also been controversial and has been accused 
of civil liberties infractions, waste and pork barrel-based distributions of grants (Mueller and 
Stewart, 2012; Coats, Karahan and Tollison, 2006).  
2.3.2   EU-US Usage: Convergence or Divergence? 
The EU and its member states, as close allies and trading partners of the US, have had to respond 
to the demands of its homeland security agenda not just in the counterterrorism field but also in 
efforts to secure US borders. This has not been a straightforward cooperation. As Rees and Aldrich 
(2005) point out the strategic cultures related to terrorism are very different on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Firstly, they claim that, in contrast to the US which declared a global war on terror, 
European states have regarded counterterrorism as a law enforcement and internal security issue. 
The more legalistic rights-based European approach meant that US policies like extraordinary 
rendition and Guantanamo Bay were problematic for many European politicians (Archick, 2011). 
Secondly, Rees and Aldrich (2005) suggest that some EU states had a long domestic history of 
dealing with terrorism and that this led them to think that Al Qaeda was not as radically different 
as the US claimed. Thirdly, attitudes to citizens’ rights on electronic surveillance and private data 
protection differ. The European Parliament in particular raised concerns about and demanded 
revisions to agreements on the transfer of banking data (Swift Accord) and air passenger data 
(Passenger Name Record) to the US (Archick, 2011). Finally, although the EU has a counterterrorism 
coordinator, it has nothing corresponding in size or powers to the Department of Homeland 
Security. 
However, many commentators claim there has been a convergence in EU-US stances on homeland 
security. In part, this is due to the more multilateral approach of the second Bush administration 
and particularly the Obama administration, which has started to act on EU civil rights concerns 
particularly about the treatment of detainees (Archick, 2011). Others however stress the use that 
the Commission made in the immediate shock of 9/11 to push for a rapid transfer of internal 
security powers to the EU level; something that member states had traditionally been cautious 
about; meant that the EU’s emerging internal security policies were partially constructed in 
response to the US and the need for transatlantic cooperation (Lodge, 2004; Pawlak, 2009). Archick 
(2011) points particularly to the EU’s agreement in 2010 on a first internal security strategy, which 
in scope at least resembles the tasks covered by the US homeland security concept. One could also 
point to the way in which the need for the EU to be seen to be doing something on 
counterterrorism, also meant the passage of measures, which had been proposed earlier but not 
agreed. Bossong (2008), for example, points out that 14 out of the 18 measures proposed by the 
Commission to the special European Council meeting of 21 September 2001 went beyond or had 
only tenuous connections to counterterrorism. In particular, the growing interest in surveillance 
technologies applies as much to other fields of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice like 
migration and organised crime. For critics like Hayes (2006; 2009) and Lodge (2004) this has 
allowed the EU to push ahead with measures that do not correspond to the values that the EU is 
founded upon. For Lodge (2004: 253) the “EU homeland security agenda and the associated 
biometric instruments signal the increasing securitisation of the EU but challenge the EU’s 
commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy and justice and potentially compromise 
citizens’ right to privacy.”  
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Lodge (2004) sees the EU’s adoption of homeland security measures as driven by a supine 
subservience to the US rather than by internal imperatives.  
Other commentators like Archick (2011) and Bossong (2008) are rather more sceptical about the 
levels of actual implementation of the agreed measures. Both cite the very different national 
attitudes to internal security amongst the EU states as a hindrance to successful implementation. 
There are many problems facing any EU attempt to implement common internal security 
regulations. Policing, intelligence and border control customs vary considerably within the EU as 
does the role of the military in internal security. There are moreover 29 distinct legal systemsI 
within the EU’s member states, all of which have different procedures, case law and traditions. 
Finally, national Constitutional Courts can declare EU measures to be unconstitutional as the 
German court did with the European Arrest Warrant. 
However, just as within the US, critics see evidence of European states being reconfigured as 
security states. Hallsworth and Lea (2011: 142) suggest that there are “three areas in which the 
security state is emerging—the transition from welfare to workfare and risk management; new 
measures to combat terrorism and organized crime; and the blurring of warfare and crime control”. 
At the EU level criticism has focused particularly on attempts to secure the external border and in 
particular the EUROSUR integrated border management proposal, which would rely heavily on 
surveillance technologies sited on the EU’s borders and in third countries to control the border 
territory. This is seen by critics as evidence of the militarisation of border control (Hayes and 
Vermeulen, 2012). These developments raise important ethical questions that will be returned to 
in section five. 
2.4 Security and Defence: Usage within the EU 
Context 
2.4.1   The EU and Defence  
Although the EU now possesses a Common Security and Defence Policy, it should be stressed that 
it has little to do with defence as it is traditionally understood. Rather in its current state, it is 
primarily a mechanism to allow the EU to launch humanitarian interventions (Mérand, 2008). 
Member states remain keen that the policy remains intergovernmental in character. The policy 
area is complicated further by the fact that increasingly member states seem to prefer to keep 
NATO as the provider of classic defence, and by intergovernmental defence cooperation outside 
the EU like the Franco-British Agreements of 2010. Despite these factors, for many years the 
Commission has been keen to play a role in defence issues, but until recently with the security 
research initiative has not been successful.II National protectionism of uncompetitive defence firms 
is one reason, sensitivities about a policy that is at the core of national sovereignty another, but 
one important reason is that the Commission itself did not display a united front. 
Mörth (2000 and with Britz, 2004) has concentrated on explaining the Commission’s comparative 
failure by considering the governance characteristics of ‘framing’ (2000) and ‘organising’ (2004). It 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Within the UK, Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate legal systems to those of England and Wales. 
II  The Commission’s efforts and their limitations are described at length in section 4 of the report. 
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can be argued that the Commission could have gained a defence role earlier, had it not been for its 
internal battles, and the relative success of member states in creating intergovernmental 
organisational fields such as OCCAR for multinational defence procurement management and the 
Framework Agreement on defence industrial restructuring. Mörth (2000) argued that rivalry 
between the Industry and External Relations Commissioners (Bangemann and van den Broek) in 
the 1990s about whose portfolio the issue belonged to, prevented two communiqués on defence 
industrial issues being presented as successfully as they could have been and thus leading to their 
rejection by the Council. This confusion about whether armaments policy belongs in the Single 
Market, enterprise or external relations portfolio has prevented the Commission always acting in a 
united or coherent fashion on this process.  
2.4.2   Blurring the Concepts of Security and Defence 
Within the EU itself, there is some evidence that the blurring of security and defence has been 
deliberately carried out by the Commission to permit it to expand its role in the defence sector 
(Mawdsley, 2011; Edler and James, 2012). Two key 2002 reports (STAR21 and ACARE) by lobby 
groups for aerospace and aeronautics made the case that technological innovation in the defence 
and aerospace fields was key to wider economic success for the EU. The Commission response in a 
March 2003 Commission Communiqué ‘Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy’ was positive.  
Under the heading towards a more coherent European advanced security research effort, the 
Commission called for increased coordination of security research. It said it would ask national 
administrations, the business community and research institutions their opinions on what 
European agenda for research in this field should look like and “to launch a preparatory action to 
coordinate such research at the EU level, focusing on a limited number of concrete technologies 
linked to the Petersberg tasks” (European Commission, 2003a). The Commission seemed to be 
planning to fund defence research but the 2003 establishment of the European Defence Agency 
with a remit in that area made it politically impossible (Mawdsley, 2011).  The Commission set up a 
Group of Personalities to look at the issue, which duly reported in 2004 making the case that there 
was no real difference between military and civilian research and pointing out the US investment in 
homeland security as a further example of how the EU was falling behind. Their report helped to 
shape the civilian security research priority in the 7th Framework Programme. More recently, in 
May 2009 a decision was taken by the European Defence Ministers to task the European Defence 
Agency to establish a European Framework Cooperation for Security and Defence together with the 
European Commission with the aim of “maximising complementarity and synergy between defence 
and civil security-related research activities”.I This suggests that as far as research is concerned the 
EU no longer really recognises a difference between the two types of research. 
Does this matter? For some, it is merely a question of semantics. Tim Robinson, senior vice-
president of Thales’ security division, is quoted as commenting on the changing homeland security 
market: "I see a shift in emphasis and an increasing balance between what we see as defence and 
homeland security. 'Security' is a more politically acceptable way of describing what was 
traditionally defence." (Euractiv, 2006) For others like Hayes (2006; 2009), the blurring of the 
boundaries of military and civilian is a worrying development with concerning implications for civil 
liberties in Europe. Moreover, the manner in which these developments have taken place has 
meant that the Commission’s engagement with defence issues has been concentrated in the 
industrial and technological sphere, which potentially leaves it with a limited outlook. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Council of the European Union, 2943rd External Relations Council meeting, Conclusion on European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), Brussels, 18 May 2009 
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2.5 Summary 
This brief review of some of the policy and academic debates, which impact on the question of 
whether we can still adequately distinguish between a civilian-based homeland security and a 
military-based defence, has shown that the question is complex. It has shown that academic 
debates about the post-Cold War meaning of security have been picked up by EU policymakers. 
Firstly, the deepening of the security concept to look at threats to individual rather than just states 
and the development of the human security ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine has deeply 
influenced the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy, which is not really about 
military defence but rather humanitarian intervention. This means that a variety of non-military 
public and private actors are involved in the field alongside the military. Secondly, the broadening 
of the security concept to encompass non-military threats forms the basis of the European Security 
Strategy and associated policies. There are though fears that the securitisation of a growing 
number of fields legitimises actions that may not be wholly compatible with EU values. 
The second part of the review looked at the emergence of the homeland security concept in the 
United States and the influence it has had on the European Union. It argued that while there were 
clear differences between the European states and the US on responses to terrorism, a decade of 
transatlantic cooperation post 9/11 has increased convergence. It was suggested that in part this 
was due to the adoption by the US of some EU ideas, but more importantly that homeland security 
had impacted on the EU considerably because of a previous absence of policies at the EU level in 
this field and the need to respond to the US demands for cooperation, allowed this to frame the 
field within the EU. For some this was an unwelcome development particularly where civil liberties 
were concerned. For others, the fact that the EU was still so split by big national differences on 
internal security meant that the EU was a far from effective actor. 
The final part of the review looked at the emergence of defence in the EU. The determination of 
most member states to keep the field intergovernmental had led to Commission to try to frame 
defence in different ways to allow it an entry point. After intra-Commission disagreements the 
industry and research portfolios were seen as their best opportunity to gain a role. However the 
setting up of the European Defence Agency with a remit in those areas meant that the Commission 
had to label its funding plans as security and draw on the Homeland security model. This has had 
the effect of blurring the lines between civilian and military still further and anchoring Commission 
activism in the industrial and technological spheres. In conclusion, this review suggests that there is 
a firm basis for questioning whether one can still draw a distinction between security and defence, 
civilian and military or internal and external security in the EU. However, the lack of conceptual 
clarity in the ways that these terms are being used mean that empirical investigations of the 
material factors (market and technologies) and policy aspects need to be undertaken. 
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3 The Characteristics of the Security and 
Defence Market in the EU 
3.1 Introduction 
This section of the report aims to outline the characteristics of both the security and defence 
markets in the EU. This entails looking at both the supply (firms) and demand (users) sides of the 
market(s) as well as the products being researched, developed and procured. The aim of the 
section is to see whether the security and defence markets are separate entities, have some 
overlap or can be largely seen as interchangeable. The section begins by outlining some of the 
methodological problems in defining the security and defence sectors. It then offers a definition of 
the security sector and what it entails. The next sub-section looks at research and technologies; it 
briefly discusses research funding, the uses and limitations of the taxonomy approach, and asks 
whether it is possible to differentiate between security and defence technologies, and finally tries 
to address the contemporary role of the defence and security sectors in systems of innovation. It 
then considers industry, offering a discussion of how security industry might be defined and how it 
will be treated in this report, followed by analysis of how both defence and non-defence firms have 
approached the sector as it expanded, and what trends are emerging. The final substantive sub-
section looks at user groups; after identifying the key groups, it questions whether in the 
contemporary security environment, civilian and military roles and technology requirements have 
become blurred. Finally, it assesses whether very different civilian and military procurement and 
requirement definition processes mean that the demand side of the market remains fragmented, 
and if so whether this can be overcome.  
3.2 Defining the Security and Defence Sectors: 
Problems and Limitations 
It is important to start by recognising that any analysis of either the EU defence or even more so 
the security sector will struggle to find adequate quantitative data. Defence economists have long 
pointed to such problems as the inadequacy of OECD categories to measure defence research, 
given the growing importance of dual-use and civilian technologies in the sector (Molas-Gallart, 
1999), or issues about defining the defence industrial base, which lead to problems of satisfactory 
measurement (Dunne, 1995; Hartley, 2011). Even companies widely considered to be defence firms 
are rarely engaged entirely on defence projects, but also have substantial civilian portfolios. 
Moreover, while figures for EU member states’ defence expenditure, and the proportion thereof 
dedicated to equipment, are collected in a standardised fashion by both NATO and the European 
Defence AgencyI and so can be compared, it remains the case that outside fairly well-documented 
major procurement projects, data on what the equipment budget is spent on, can be difficult to 
obtain. Similarly, detailed company accounts are not available for commercial reasons. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Additionally, the yearly analysis of global military expenditure by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies are reliable sources of data. 
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it has thus far been impossible to get comparable data across the EU member states for the 
proportion of additional government expenditure used to support defence industry, through 
support for arms exports, offset deals, research subsidies for research carried out by state-funded 
universities and research institutes, regional funding, and preferential procurement processes to 
name just a few. These lacunae all hinder comprehensive cross-national quantitative research. 
These problems are considerably greater when the security sector is considered. Firstly, the 
boundaries of the security sector are not the subject of a widely agreed definition (the definition of 
security industry used throughout this study and the rationale will be explained in 3.2.1). Even the 
European Commission (2012a) accepts there is no generally accepted definition. Secondly, even in 
comparison to the defence sector reliable statistical information is hard to obtain. As Martí 
Sempere (2011) points out, although Eurostat does offer some information that could help to 
identify expenditure, imports and exports, the NACEI codes that cover some security products and 
services e.g. code 80 for security and investigation activities and 84.24 for public order and safety 
activities are problematic as they do not cover everything. Moreover, codes that would cover other 
types of security equipment aggregate security with non-security equipment. In other words, in 
terms of industrial activity classifications, the security industry cannot be adequately identified and 
so defined. Similarly, attempting to reconcile national government data is problematic. Many states 
do not have a single budget line for security, rather security responsibilities are divided across 
ministries and agencies, and often in federal states between federal and regional levels of 
government (Masson and Marta, 2011). This means that comparison between states is 
problematic. Company level data is also sparse again for commercial reasons. While this report will 
draw on accumulated data from EU-level industry associations and the data in two major reports 
for the European Commission (ECORYS et al (2009) on the industrial competitiveness of the 
security industry and IRIS et al (2010) on the blurring of dividing lines between defence and 
security), it should be recognised that in all cases the figures given are recognised to be estimates 
or to represent partial or contradictory data (Hartley, 2011). IRIS et al (2010: 26) for example claim 
that they found it impossible to quantify the security sector as the available data were not 
verifiable. 
3.2.1   What is the European Security Sector? 
What is the European security industrial sector? A simple question perhaps, but it is one that is 
surprisingly difficult to answer. Viewed as a catch-all term, it covers a large number of firms 
supplying products and services to a range of customers from individuals to nation states in 
response to a wide spectrum of security issues. Drawing on definitions proposed by ESRAB (2006) 
among others, Martí Sempere proposes that in this sense, security industry could be defined as 
follows: 
“The security industry addresses all products and services used specifically by the human being to 
prepare, prevent, protect, respond, reduce, palliate and deal with the threats and consequences 
that undesired events have on our society. These consequences may be summarised in terms of 
damage to people’s life, health, property or other assets, including information.” (Martí Sempere, 
2011: 246) 
However, as Martí Sempere (2011) accepts, for analytical purposes, it is necessary to narrow the 
focus. He proposes a focus on the industry that has developed to tackle insecurity caused by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes 
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new threats of international terrorism and organised crime, which he identifies as the most 
important contemporary threats. However, this suggestion leads him to exclude firms that supply 
traditional military equipment (Martí Sempere, 2011: 248); an exclusion which is problematic for 
this report, which concentrates on the EU position, given the prominence given to representatives 
of this sector of industry in the consultations and advisory groups set up by the European 
Commission to consider the security industrial section (see Section 4). Moreover, similar to the US 
catch-all understanding of homeland security, what EU legislation there is in this area, such as 
Directive 2008/114/EC on critical infrastructure protection, makes it clear that while terrorism is 
viewed as the primary threat, the legislation is also intended to cover all threats, including those 
from natural disasters (Council of the EU, 2008b). 
Like Martí Sempere, ECORYS et al (2009) also emphasised the need to narrow the definition of the 
security sector in their report for DG-Enterprise and Industry on the competitiveness of security 
industry in Europe. Their model for scoping the sector differentiated between the traditional 
security market, based around the largely private and corporate provision of protection for persons 
and property, the defence market, and the ‘new security market’ responding to ‘new’ security 
threats such as terrorism, organised crime, cyber-crime and protection from and response to major 
catastrophes. The latter they argue is immature, arguably only having been called into existence 
since 9/11 and the subsequent US launch of a major Homeland Security programme. They do 
however, also point out that there is noticeable blurring between their three categories. While they 
may disagree on which ‘new threats’ to concentrate on Martí Sempere (2011) and ECORYS et al 
(2009) agree that there is a new type of security industry sector emerging to tackle these issues.I 
IRIS et al (2010) took a rather different approach, as their work concentrated on analysing the 
extent of blurring between security and defence rather than defining the security industrial sector. 
Their analysis starts from an identification of mission areas identified as relevant thus defining 
security missions as the four types identified by ESRAB (2006) (protection against terrorism and 
organised crime; border security; critical infrastructure protection and restoration of security in 
case of crisis) and armed forces missions as limited to three areas outlined by French, Italian and 
German defence policy guidelinesII (traditional defence of territory and deterrence; crisis 
management operations and support to civil protection) and established where blurring occurred. 
They then identify the technologies and equipment needed by the missions in this blurred area. 
Their argument that there has been a blurring between internal and external security missions is 
convincing and will be returned to in section 3.5.2. However, this approach left them with the 
conclusion that the relevant market segment is characterised by “extreme complexity and 
fragmentation, with numerous industrial players coming from various industrial areas and 
providing different types of solutions” (IRIS et al, 2010: 139), whereas both Martí Sempere (2011) 
and ECORYS et al (2009) were able to offer more focussed discussions of the nature of the security 
sector. 
What all three analyses share (implicitly if not explicitly) is a concentration on technological 
productsIII, rather than the full spectrum of security products and services, and an expectation that 
the customer will be a governmental organisation. This fits well with the EU policy agenda in this 
sector. Indeed the Commission (2012a) explicitly says that its security industrial policy does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  This was an opinion shared by European Commission officials from DG-Research and DG-Enterprise and Industry interviewed 
in April 2008. 
II  This does suggest a degree of commonality between these documents that is perhaps over-stated in this report. 
III  There is a very interesting gap here between the academic literature on the security industry sector, which has largely ignored 
security technologies and instead concentrated on those firms supplying personnel and services to conflict zones and these 
policy studies funded by the European Commission with a strong technology focus.  
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cover service provision. For the purposes of this report therefore the security industrial sector will 
be defined as firms from a variety of industrial backgrounds offering technological products to 
governmental customers in response to security concerns. It does not therefore seek to exclude 
defence firms from the analysis, or to limit security concerns to specific issues, but does limit the 
products considered to technology-orientated ones and omits the corporate and private security 
customer in favour of governmental actors as this latter group has been the focus of EU policy 
actions. 
The European Organisation for Security (EOS), which represents private security sector providers of 
technology solutions and services, commissioned an evaluation of the security market (thus 
defined) in 2011. While again they stress the limitations of the quantitative data collected, they 
have attempted to reconcile internal marketing figures from their members with data from 
commercial studies. They suggest four main sectors exist within their industry:    
− Border Control 
− Civil & Citizens’ Protection 
− Cyber Security 
− Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
They estimate that overall turnover in the EU for 2009 was €10.5 bn. including exports outside the 
EU (internal turnover estimates - border control €1.54 bn., civil and citizens’ protection €2.69 bn., 
cyber security €1.85 bn., critical infrastructure protection 1.57 bn.€ totalling €7.65 bn.) and 
employed an estimated 50,000 people within the EU (EOS, 2011). ECORYS et al (2009) estimated 
the total value of the security sector to be approximately €36 bn. in 2008, with 80% of the demand 
side coming from the public sector. What technologies does this require? The ESRAB report (2006: 
50) argued that the following technologies are needed: 
A EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY: FROM INNOVATION POLICY TO EXPORT CONTROLS P 2 2  
Table 1: Security Technologies 
Technology Domain Priority Technology Areas 
Signal & information 
technologies  
Data fusion techniques, data collection/data classification, image/pattern processing technology, 
information fusion technology, data and information management technology (DB, etc.)  
Artificial intelligence and 
decision support  
Text-mining/data-mining, IKBS/AI/expert techniques, knowledge management, modelling and simulation, 
optimisation and decision support technology  
Sensor equipment  Cameras, radar sensor equipment, NRBC sensors (in particular biological and chemical threat detection 
technologies), passive IR sensors equipments  
Sensor technologies  Hyperspectral/multispectral sensors, hyperspectral/multispectral processing, autonomous small 
sensors/smart dust technolologies, IR sensor technologies, Terahertz sensors, optical sensors technologies, 
acoustic sensors — passive  
Communication equipment  Reconfigurable communications, mobile secured communications, communications network management 
and control equipment, network supervisor, network and protocol independent secured communications, 
information security, secured, wireless broadband data links for secured communications, protection of 
communication networks against harsh environment  
Human sciences  Human behaviour analysis and modelling, population behaviour, human factors in the decision process, 
teams, organisations and cultures  
Information security 
technologies  
Encryption and key management, data-mining, access control, filtering technologies, authentication 
technologies, encryption technologies (cryptography)  
Computing technologies  Protocol technology, SW architectures, secure computing techniques, high performance computing, high 
integrity and safety critical computing, software engineering  
Information 
warfare/intelligence systems  
Infrastructure to support information management and dissemination, cyber security policy management 
tools, optimisation, planning and decision support systems  
Scenario and decision 
simulation  
Impact analysis concepts and impact reduction, advanced human behaviour modelling and simulation, 
simulation for decision making (real time simulation), structures vulnerability prediction, evacuation and 
consequence management techniques, mission simulation  
Information systems  Infrastructure to support information management and dissemination, cyber security policy management 
tools, optimisation, planning and decision support systems  
Navigation, guidance, 
control and tracking  
RFID tags, tracking, GPS, radio-navigation, direction finding and map guidance, bar code based tracing  
Forensic technologies — 
biometry  
Fingerprints recognition (digital fingerprints), facial recognition, iris/retina, voice, handwriting, signature 
reconnaissance  
Integrated platforms  UAVs (air/land/sea), lighter than air platforms, surveillance and navigation satellites  
Survivability and hardening 
technology  
EMC evaluation and hardening, smart clothes and equipment, anti-blast glasses/concretes, etc., critical 
buildings specific architectures, blast and shock effects  
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As the table shows there is some clear crossover between the technologies required in the key 
areas of this new market segment and those used in the defence sector. Examples include 
unmanned aerial vehicles, sensor technologies and mobile secure communications.  Does this 
mean the technologies are interchangeable? 
3.3 Security and Defence Technologies 
This section will discuss the links between security and defence technologies. It begins with a short 
discussion of how defence research and development funding has worked in the EU given that 
there are clear implications for the way in which security R&D might work in the future. It then 
discusses whether or not the technologies are interchangeable and the consequences of them both 
being highly reliant on generic technologies. 
3.3.1   Defence R&D Expenditure and Trends: Implications for Security 
Technology? 
This brief section seeks to outline various issues that have an impact on European defence research 
and development funding, which are likely to be relevant to security research and development. 
Firstly, as the table below shows, EU spending on defence research and development is heavily 
focussed on two states, France and the UK, with Germany in third place. Many EU member states 
spend little or no money on defence research and development. Moreover, the effects of the 
financial crisis can be observed, noticeably in Italy and Spain post 2008. 
Electronic authentication  Electronic tagging systems, smart cards  
Biotechnology  Rapid analysis of biological agents and of human susceptibility to diseases and toxicants, decontamination 
techniques, water testing and purification techniques, food testing and control techniques  
Simulators, trainers and 
synthetic environments  
Virtual and augmented reality, tactical/crew training systems, command and staff training systems, 
synthetic environments  
Chemical, biological and 
medical materials  
Chemical and biological detection techniques  
Signal protection (warfare)  Non-cooperative target recognition, geographic information systems  
Space systems  Earth observation (image and communications)  
Light and strong materials, 
coatings, …  
Light materials for human protection, smart textiles, light materials for site protection, self-protective and 
explosive resistant material technology, surfaces treatments for improvement of life duration, corrosion 
reduction  
Energy generation storage 
and distribution  
Electrical generators, electrical batteries, energy distribution  
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Table 2: EU Defence R&D Spending 2006-10 (in € million) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Austria 0.81 1 0.87 7.5 1 
Belgium   9.66 9.3 9.2 
Bulgaria 0.42 0.42 0.244 0 0 
Cyprus    0 0 
Czech Rep. 18.5 18.4 21.8 20.8 20.2 
Estonia 1 1 1.8 0.3 0.7 
Finland 30.7 44 27.6 44.1 38.3 
France 3777 3231 3281 3704 3580 
Germany 1035 1213 1183.1 1088 1455 
Greece 0.06 7.3 10.89 4.7 10 
Hungary 0.82 0.974 2.79 3.5 0.3 
Ireland 0   0 0 
Italy 252 341 251.7 139 64 
Latvia 0.423 0.27 0.171 0.2 0.03 
Lithuania    0 0 
Luxembourg   1.6 2.1 
Malta    0 0 
Netherlands 112 107 105 105 75 
Poland 37.6 53.9 50.89 88.9 121 
Portugal 5.624 4.699 4 9 7 
Romania 3.4 15.3 7.3 2.3 2.1 
Slovakia 3.7 2.49 3.5 5.3 0.1 
Slovenia 19.5 12.8 17.5 11.2 7.8 
Spain 201 276.6 314 229 162 
Sweden 266 299 235 151 107 
UK 4012 4011 3214 2770 2895 
Source: European Defence Agency 
As Masson and Marta (2011) point out these trends appear to be being followed in the government 
funding of security research and development. The only major programmes that they note are in 
Britain, France and Germany:  
“In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research allocated around 123M€ for the 
period 2007–2011 for civil security research. In France, the Délégation Générale pour l’Armement 
(within the MoD), alongside the Agence National pour la Recherche conducts a “concepts, systems 
and tools for global security” program with 12.7M€ in funding for 2009. In the UK, the Home Office 
Scientific Development Branch supports the Home Office’s mission, which is an investment of 
approximately 65M€ per year.” (Masson and Marta, 2011: 113) 
While this is clearly not a comprehensive overview of all security research spending in the member 
states, if as section 3.4 suggests, the financing of research is a concern for both defence and non-
defence firms i.e. that firm-funded research will need to be complemented to a large degree by 
state funding, then it strongly suggests that research and development may be concentrated in 
comparatively few states. It is noticeable for example that prior to the EU initiative on security 
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research, only Sweden and Austria considered security research and development worth special 
funding, despite the high entry costs for firms looking to enter the market. 
The European Defence Agency has, since its establishment, been trying to foster collaborative 
research and development. However, as the table below shows, such efforts are declining again, 
and do not show a great advance over the Western European Armaments Group’s (WEAG) 
collaborative efforts. 
Table 3: EU Collaborative Research and Technology Spending (in € million) 
Year Amount 
2005 206 
2006 254 
2007 332.75 
2008 412 
2009 290 
2010 246 
Source: European Defence Agency 
This suggests that the European Commission may struggle to increase member state participation 
in collaborative security research outside of the EU research framework programmes and other EU 
funding. 
3.3.2   Can Security and Defence Technologies be Differentiated? 
There are a variety of different systems of technology labelling, or taxonomies, in use in Europe and 
worldwide including those from the European Defence Agency (EDA), the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG), the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB), the Militarily 
Critical Technologies List (MCTL), and the Developing Science and Technologies List (DSTL). A 
project called the stakeholder's platform for supply chain mapping, market condition analysis and 
technologies opportunities (STACCATO) tried to bring in particular the work done by WEAG and 
ESRAB together to provide a taxonomy that would be of use to both the supply and demand side.I 
The taxonomy attempted not just to map technologies used and how these feed into equipment, 
but also how to classify the needs of missions as defined by EU policy. The seven sections are: 
− (I) Technologies and Components 
− (II) Equipments and sub systems 
− (IIIA) Systems-Services Functions 
− (IIIB) Design-Manufacturing 
− (IV) Integrated platforms and systems and Human Factors 
− (VA) Missions Capabilities 
− (VB) Policy and Support 
A later attempt was made by the Joint Research Centre to map the technologies that firms 
possessed onto mission capabilities and support needs but this required voluntary participation by 
firms and proved not very successful. The STACCATO taxonomy has also been criticised for not 
paying sufficient attention to the security technologies supplied by non-defence suppliers. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The full taxonomy can be found at: http://www.asd-europe.org/site/fileadmin/user_upload/STACCATO_final_taxonomy.pdf 
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problem of the multiplicity of taxonomies or classifications that are in use is that it can prove 
difficult (potentially in arms control / export negotiations) to agree on how a particular technology 
should be classified.I 
It is true to say that there has been some blurring of the line between military and non-military 
products supplied to defence and security end-users; this is partly due to some convergence in 
their missions e.g. counter-insurgency has commonalities with counter-terrorism, but also because 
of the dynamics of technological innovation. However, it is important not to overstate this case.  
While there are some products that are of interest to both military and non-military users such as 
secure communications and surveillance technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles and sensors, 
there still is a large amount of difference between military and non-military products.II Aircraft-
carriers, fighter jets and advanced missile technology, for example, remain clearly military 
products. A missile manufacturer like MBDA is unlikely to enter the security market precisely 
because there is little crossover in useful technologies. Stankiewicz et al (2009) insist that this 
division will be maintained as ministries of defence will be careful to retain control over and 
investment in some defence technologies for reasons of national security and security of supply. 
Where there is less difference in the technologies underpinning the products. If we reconsider the 
STACCATO taxonomy of technologies of interest to security and defence users, then James (2009a: 
7) argues that there are still several technology classes that “are essentially defence-specific and 
have limited (or no) application outside in other fields (namely, 102 – Materials for deterrence; 103 
– Stealth materials and technologies; and, 105 – Energetic materials).”III Most defence and civilian 
security products however are heavily reliant on a wide range of generic technologies. 
3.3.3   Innovative Technologies and the Security and Defence Sectors 
While during the Cold War, it was assumed that defence technologies were the most advanced, 
spinning out into commercial applications but with the technologies themselves essentially secure, 
today as Stankiewicz et al (2009: 21) argue: 
“The end of self-sufficiency is indeed a pervasive phenomenon. It affects firms, industries, sectors 
and countries. The vertically-integrated techno-military complexes are no longer secure sources of 
most relevant technologies. Defence and civil security products rely heavily on generic, globally 
available technologies not least information and communications technologies (ICTs). Advances in 
microsystems, nanotechnology, unmanned systems, communications and sensors, digital 
technology, bio- and material sciences, energy and power technologies and neuro-technologies 
have all been identified as important for the defence sector and most if not all can be characterised 
as generic technologies.” 
In other words, the Cold War defence innovation model is breaking down. Industry representatives 
interviewed in January 2012 were ready to admit that defence firms were no longer at the 
forefront of innovation and had not been for some time. Because both military and non-military 
security products draw on generic technologies, this does blur the boundaries around both 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  There has been some work using data mining techniques to overcome this. See for example Thorleuchter and van den Poel 
(2011). 
II  In addition obvious areas of overlap are in non-technological areas such as uniforms, protective clothing, logistics etc. 
III  One industry representative interviewed in January 2012 suggested that the overlap between security and defence 
technologies shown in the Staccato taxonomy had possibly been overstated as the participants in the research had come from 
the defence sector. It was suggested that if telecommunications or ICT firms had carried out a similar exercise the results 
might be different. 
A EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY: FROM INNOVATION POLICY TO EXPORT CONTROLS P 2 7  
knowledge production and the application of the technologies, not just between military and non-
military security products, but with wider civilian and commercial technology innovation (James, 
2009b). Moreover, the fact that many defence and security products draw on commercially 
available technologies, particularly ICT technologies, mean that these technologies are also 
potentially available to hostile users if they have or acquire the systems integration capacities to 
utilise them. European systems integration capacities, and the protection of these capacities, may 
therefore turn out to be more important than the technologies per se. Industry interviewees in 
January 2012 pointed out that this also means new dilemmas around security of supply are 
emerging. Microchips, for example, are crucial for many contemporary defence products, but the 
quantity and frequency of supply that defence firms need in Europe is not sufficient to be highly 
attractive to suppliers in Asia and North America. This also means that there are new challenges for 
those concerned about defence and security technology proliferation. In conclusion, the question is 
perhaps less whether defence and security products are blurring but more the fact that they are 
both dependent on generic technologies and so much less able to be protected than in the past. 
3.4 Supply Side 
3.4.1   Defence Firms and their Approaches to the Security Sector 
It is not possible to generalise about the approach of all defence firms to the security sector, but if 
we breakdown the structure of the defence industrial sector into tiers of producers, some 
generalisations become possible. The defence industrial sector can be described as a pyramid with 
systems integrators like BAE, EADS, Thales and Finmeccanica at the top in the first tier, specialised 
sub-system producers in the second tier, and below this a large range component and service 
suppliers, which act as sub-contractors to the higher levels and are often SMEs.I Contrary to what is 
often assumed, after a period of contraction following the end of the Cold War, many of Europe’s 
defence firms are performing well. Employment across the aerospace and defence industry has 
risen steadily since 2003 and has been strong in the defence sector (notably in the land industry), 
while profit margins have remained good: this is partially explained by changes in statistical 
calculations on employment in the sector by some states like Germany and the Netherlands, but is 
largely explained by steady export growth particularly to Asia and the Middle East (ASD-Europe, 
2010).II  While future prospects within Europe will be negatively affected by the financial crisis and 
austerity measures, the point that is important to make here, is that the defence sector has not 
been forced to enter into the security market, rather firms have been able to do this on their own 
terms. This has meant that the strategic calculations have varied from firm to firm. Interviews in 
2012 with industry representatives from the defence sector suggested that initial belief amongst 
defence firms, in the period around 2003 after US announcements of Homeland Security funding, 
that this would be a thriving new market segment with substantial business opportunities, have 
since been tempered as European government demand has failed to meet these early predictions. 
Defence firms have three options to enter into the security market; firstly, they can develop a 
presence in the security market through exploitation of their existing defence technologies; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  It is worth emphasising that while identifying as defence firms, many have a substantial civilian business especially in 
aeronautics. Interviewees from the sector in 2012 suggested that the civilian-military divide was more meaningful to 
categorise their business activities than a defence-security one. 
II  These statistics do not include suppliers which do not consider defence to be their main interest: this includes many firms 
within supply chains. 
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secondly, they can diversify through the acquisition of security firms; and thirdly, they can enter 
the market through partnerships. IRIS et al (2010: 143-44) suggest however that for defence firms 
to move successfully into the security market three business conditions need to be in place: 
− Valuable and distinctive technologies that are viewed as such by security customers and which 
have a commercial advantage over those offered by non-defence firms. (It is worth noting that 
for some defence firms their technologies may be more readily diversified into different sectors 
entirely.) 
− Access to the necessary complementary capabilities – here they suggest that marketing to new 
types of customer is a weakness that defence firms have to compensate for (potentially by 
acquiring firms that are already active in the sector). 
− Viable business model that accepts that the security sector works in a different way to the 
defence sector and that is realistic about different overheads, investment needs and regulatory 
environments. 
The different types of customer, business and regulatory environments will be returned to in more 
depth in section 3.5.  
Let us consider how the systems integrators have responded to the security market. Firstly, they 
have all made a number of acquisitions of smaller firmsI as the table below shows: 
Table 4: Major Acquisitions by European Defence Firms 2005-10 
Companies Date Firms acquired Domains 
 2005 Nokia’s Professional Mobile 
Radio (PMR) activities 
Secure telecommunication 
 
 EADS 
2006 French company Sofrelog Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) systems and 
Coastal Surveillance Systems (CSS) 
 2008 US PlantCML Emergency response solutions and services 
 2010 EADS DS and Atlas Elektronik (AE) have decided to consolidate their position 
in maritime safety and security market by merging their subsidiaries 
Sofrelog and Atlas Maritime Security, a spin-off of AE, to form “Sofrelog 
Atlas Maritime Security” (SA Maritime Security) 
 2007 Rail signalling and security systems business acquired from Alcatel-Lucent 
 Thales 2008 British company n-Cipher Encryption firm (Internet and communications 
system security market) 
 2008 Dutch company Sdu-
Identification 
Secure identification documents, including 
electronic and biometric passports, ID cards 
and driver  licenses 
 
 Safran 
2009 US Motorola’s biometrics 
business 
Printrak trademark. Automated fingerprint 
identification systems (AFIS) 
 2009 81% of US GE Homeland 
Protection 
Systems to detect dangerous or illicit 
materials (X-ray tomography detection 
systems). Much of the technology is designed 
for use in airport screening. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Several interviewees suggested in January 2012 that the acquisition of SMEs in particular by defence firms on occasion was in 
order to meet requirements for participation in the security research programme, which looked for geographical balance and 
SME participation. 
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 Finmeccanica 
2007 British VEGA Consulting 
Services Ltd (VEGA) 
Project management as well as advanced 
solutions for simulation and training 
 2008 US DRS Technologies VTMS, port security, law enforcement, border 
control; subcontractor to Boeing on SBInet 
 
 
 BAE Systems 
2008 British DETICA Technologies for analytical decision support, 
real-time situational awareness and control, 
secure computing and communications (anti-
terrorism and anti-fraud applications) 
 2000-
2009 
More than ten US acquisitions in IT, defence electronics and land armament 
sectors 
Source: Masson and Marta (2011: 122) 
In addition to this table, recent noticeable acquisitions in 2010 include French defence and 
aerospace group Safran’s purchase of L-1 Identity Solutions biometric, identity and recruitment 
operations for around €1 billion, which will make Safran the world’s biggest biometric identification 
company. BAE also strengthened its profile in the security sector in 2010 with the acquisition of L-1 
Intelligence Services group and OASYS Technology which makes components for surveillance and 
reconnaissance.  More recently, acquisition activity seems to have slowed. 
However, despite seeming similarities there are major differences between the firms. Thales 
already had a security division which it has since consolidated with additional acquisitions. It 
concentrates on surveillance, identity, intelligence and critical infrastructure protection 
technologies, and therefore was in a strong position to challenge for contracts. It is pursuing a dual-
use technology strategy. IRIS et al (2010) suggest that unlike its competitors, security is a key part 
of its business, with the division accounting for 25% of revenue in 2008. Thales therefore is perhaps 
an outlier among the European defence systems integrators. The French firm Safran is also of 
interest although a sub-system supplier. It has a strong presence in both the security and defence 
markets, but has tried to separate its security activities from its defence work to pursue a targeted 
growth strategy, therefore differing from its competitors. It owns Morpho, formerly known as 
Sagem Sécurité, which is a world leader in biometric technologies. As IRIS et al (2010) reported 
press speculation in 2009-10 was that an asset swap between Thales and Safran was being 
negotiated to exchange security and defence assets, so that Thales would concentrate on defence, 
Safran on security, thus reducing duplication of research. These talks collapsed in 2010 and despite 
French government pressure a further round of talks over swaps on avionics and optronics failed in 
November 2011 due to union pressure over jobs.I 
EADS has an integrated defence and security division (Cassidian) but as yet very little revenue 
comes from non-defence contracts, and its core business remains its traditional civilian and military 
portfolios. It is however, attempting to develop its integrated communications technologies into 
the security market, particularly outside the EU, but for the moment militaries remain the key 
customers. Cassidian has identified law enforcement, cyber security and surveillance drones as 
potential growth areas (IISS, 2012). It has been involved in the security research programme so that 
it remains well-positioned if EU demand became stronger for security products (IRIS et al, 2010). 
EADS’ most prominent acquisitions in 2011 though were Vector Airspace and Satair, both of which 
will strengthen EADS’ support and services division – an area that the firm regards as both 
profitable and countercyclical. Finmeccanica has also tried to leverage its defence technologies into 
the security sector. It has been challenged by slow demand in both defence and security in its 
Italian home base, and was over-optimistic about the development of consolidated demand in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/thales-safran-idUSWEA540420111213 
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EU, and thus its security work has been predominantly non-EU export driven. Although on paper it 
has an impressive security portfolio, IRIS et al (2010) suggested that outside its export contracts, 
the security part of the overall business is small. Finmeccanica has been keenly involved in EU 
activities in the security industrial sector, particularly the security research programme. BAE, in 
comparison, has not been active at the EU level, but has concentrated its efforts in securing 
security work in its home UK and US markets, where it has concentrated on an area of strength, 
information-based intelligence systems. Its activities however remain predominantly defence-
based. For EADS and BAE continuing strength in their classic markets means that the security 
market is currently of interest but not of overriding significance. 
In the second and third tiers of defence producers the picture is also often blurred. For some 
sectors particularly IT and defence electronics, it has been comparatively straightforward for firms 
to offer substantially the same product to both security and defence customers, assisted by some 
acquisitions of smaller firms. A notable success in this category for example, is Smiths Detection, 
part of Smiths Group, which specialises in threat detection and screening technologies. For others, 
for example missile manufacturers, there is little attraction in the new security market, or like the 
German firm Diehl (which recently chose to acquire capacities in civil aerospace services) 
alternative diversification strategies look more interesting. For the third tier of suppliers, the 
blurring is again highly dependent on product but few would ever have been entirely defence-
dependent anyway. 
As an interviewee from the European Defence Agency pointed out in January 2012, if consolidated 
customers emerged in the security sector in a framework that was similar to the defence customer 
then established defence firms would be in a strong position. They are strong in terms of managing 
governmental relations, are good at succeeding with tendering processes and have relevant 
technologies in many cases. However, success is not guaranteed. An early success for the defence 
sector was the selection of Raytheon as prime contractor in 2007 for the British E-Borders 
programme, an advanced border control and security programme. The contract was terminated in 
2010 over claims by the UK government of missed deadlines and substandard work. Raytheon is 
now suing the UK government (Curtis, 2011). Defence firms are also particularly concerned about 
embarking on major contracts without agreements in place on liability if their systems fail. 
3.4.2   Non-Defence Firms and their Approaches to the Security Sector 
Ecorys et al (2009) identified three main types of non-defence supplier in the security market: the 
traditional security industry supplying general security applications e.g. protective clothing, access 
control, fire detection, CCTV and, new entrants either from other civilian industrial sectors spinning 
in their technologies for security use (particularly ICT and telecommunications) or high-tech 
innovative start-up companies. However, within the high-end of the ‘new security’ market, as 
fostered in the EU Security Research programme, Ecorys et al (2009) found a fairly limited 
involvement of the traditional security firms, except in some surveillance technological areas. The 
relative absence of traditional security providers is perhaps not surprising. Their market has been 
characterised by short or mid-range product life cycles, privately funded R&D, a highly fragmented 
demand side and low, mainly production costs to participate. The new segment looks likely to be 
very different. ECORYS et al (2009) pointed to the nature of the demand side in this high-end 
market as being characterised by a limited number of customers (predominantly national 
governments, as they are the only legitimate users of the products), with highly specific demands, 
which combine to produce a corresponding concentration in the supply of security equipment. 
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They also argued that at the high-end of the new security market there are significant barriers to 
entry relating to 
− High investment costs relating to technological development and then the transition to the 
market (this is similar to the worries of defence firms albeit that they are accustomed to a very 
different model of R&D funding than either type of non-defence firm). 
− High costs in securing markets (lobbying, marketing and government relations) – ECORYS et al 
(2009: iv) suggest that this is related to ‘the need to ‘educate’ clients on technological 
possibilities and choices as opposed to selling ‘off-the-shelf’ technology predominantly to non-
government clients that such businesses are more accustomed to doing. 
This means that SMEs struggle for market share within the sector despite being present within the 
sector in quite high numbers,I and so when SMEs do develop technologies, they tend to either be 
acquired by the large equipment integrators or licence them to develop the technology. In other 
words the non-defence firms have very similar problems to the defence firms but coming from the 
opposite end of the business spectrum. This is not to say that non-defence firms will always be at a 
disadvantage in the new market segment. IRIS et al (2010) cite the case of a British contract, for a 
national radio for first responders, which was won by the O2 Airwave consortium led by 
telecommunications firm BT over a bid by a consortium led by defence firm EADS. However, 
ECORYS et al (2009) noted that firms originating in the civilian market were only major players in 
very few sectors e.g. Motorola in secure communications. 
Most of the studies looking at the sector therefore concentrate on the role of defence firms, partly 
because the more developed US security market is dominated by defence firms and partly because 
of the way that the policy area has been framed within EU politics (this will be covered in greater 
depth in part 4). It is arguable that non-defence firms have been excluded more than they should 
have been from the agenda-setting phase of the EU’s growing involvement in the security sector. 
Bigo and Jeandesboz (2010) conclude for example that “major defense and security companies 
have played a key role in the definition of the orientation and priorities of the EU’s research and 
development policy for security-related technical systems.” However, this is not to deny that non-
defence firms will have to accustom themselves to a very different way of working if, as the 
European Commission hopes, consolidated governmental customers emerge. This has not proven 
straightforward in some cases when a non-defence firm has entered the defence market. The 
selection of Airbus’s newly created subsidiary, Airbus Military Company, to build the A400M 
transporter aircraft was intended to draw on Airbus’s commercial experience in building civilian 
aircraft to bring rigour to the procurement. The problem was that Airbus had no experience in 
building military aircraft, was heavily distracted by problems with its key civilian aircraft project and 
had completely underestimated the risks inherent in the project (Masseret and Gauthier, 2009: 46-
8). For the moment at least though, it seems that non-defence firms are at a disadvantage outside 
of certain ICT and communications sectors. 
3.4.3   Emerging Trends?  
The general sense of the current security market is that the major defence firms have positioned 
themselves, some more wholeheartedly than others, but are waiting for the emergence of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  According to Masson and Marta (2011) SME start-up innovators, developers and providers of new security technologies, are 
according to the European Security Directory 2009 are very active in the security field. They suggest around 668 SMEs are 
involved in one way or another through EU policy actions, trade associations and registration in the directory. In a case study 
of the Netherlands, Akkermann (2012) also reports high levels of interest among smaller Dutch firms. 
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consolidated demand side in the EU. At present however, there has been relatively little 
governmental demand and what there was has slowed down. Masson and Marta (2011) argue that 
a) existing security contracts are small compared to defence ones; b) most existing large contracts 
are ending and new ones are not being launched (some large contracts have proved highly 
controversial politically too notably in the UK with identity cards and e-borders); and c) they are 
often linked to specific events like the London 2012 Olympics or are reactive following a natural 
disaster. The highly public failure of G4S to deliver on its contract to provide security for the 
London 2012 Olympics has also cast doubt on whether the state should outsource security 
functions to the private sector. The security sector at present therefore, with the exception of 
those who had been particularly well placed to take advantage of surveillance, screening and 
identity technology demands, is not a major source of income. Some large defence firms therefore 
are continuing to concentrate on defence activities, while others have turned to non-EU exports as 
a stopgap. The decisions made vary but are also affected by the health or otherwise of defence 
spending in their home markets. 
Non-security firms seem less well-placed outside of communications and ICT field. This is in part 
due to particular EU policy decisions and partly because of the large number of SMEs, which will 
find the market conditions challenging. Another development that may favour defence firms is that 
the European Commission has used the security research programme to engage in cooperation 
with the European Defence Agency. Two projects in particular are seen as success stories by the 
EDA and the Commission. 
− Software Defined Radio which has applications both for military use and use by first responders 
(police, fire service and so forth).  
− a project on the insertion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into civil airspace. (James, 2009a) 
This ad hoc cooperation led to the May 2009 decision by the European Defence Ministers to task 
the European Defence Agency to establish a European Framework Cooperation for Security and 
Defence together with the European Commission with the aim of “maximising complementarity 
and synergy between defence and civil security-related research activities”. The EDA has identified 
situational awareness (sensor technologies, command and control of networked assets) as an area 
for cooperation (James, 2009a). Discussions are also underway about the possibility of including 
defence research in the 8th Framework Programme. All of these developments look likely to 
intensify the patterns of provision emerging in the new security market, where defence firms are 
well-placed in most but not all security sectors but not guaranteed success unless consolidated 
demand emerges. If demand remains fragmented, non-defence firms and even SMEs may well find 
themselves better placed. 
3.5 Demand Side 
As has already been discussed in the previous sections, the nature of the demand side in the 
traditional security, new security and defence sectors are very important in determining the make-
up of the supply side and how research and development in the new market segment might be 
funded. The demand side in Europe is invariably criticised for its fragmentation. Is this a fair 
criticism and would the replication of the military or defence customer be a positive or negative 
outcome in the new security sector? This section will briefly outline the main user groups of 
security and defence products, question the extent to which roles and requirements have been 
blurred in contemporary security policy and then discuss the ways in which the civilian and military 
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government customer vary in terms of regulatory culture, procurement practice and requirement 
needs. 
3.5.1   Key User Groups of and Requirements for Defence and Security 
Technologies: Blurred or Distinctive? 
Claims that there has been a blurring of defence and security or more pertinently internal and 
external security for the users of these technologies tend to start from the premise that their 
missions have become intertwined. As IRIS et al (2010) point out where military missions are 
concerned, contemporary crisis management operations are often not purely military. In particular, 
when the intervention lasts into the post-conflict stage, civilian or NGO missions are often set up to 
help restore policing, administrative and rule-of-law functions as well as assisting with 
humanitarian and security sector reform tasks. Similarly military personnel may find themselves 
assisting with various internal security missions such as counter-terrorism operations, support for 
civil protection, critical infrastructure protection and border security.I The roles that the armed 
forces may or may not play in these types of missions is often defined in national constitutions, so 
does vary between the EU states, but it is indubitable that there are fuzzy boundaries between 
military and civilian functions; this is even more the case in states with paramilitary forces such as 
gendarmeries. 
The crossover though goes beyond ‘mission creep’ – clearly if military and civilian forces are to 
cooperate on joint operations then a degree of interoperability is required, be that in terms of 
training, communications equipment or integrated command structures. There is however, for the 
purposes of this study, perhaps a more interesting dimension of this crossover where civilian and 
military personnel might find themselves using similar technologies to carry out similar tasks but in 
very different environments. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been used to 
great effect in military operations, notably in carrying out targeted killings in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, but are also considered to be potentially useful (unarmed) for carrying out policing 
activities such as observing football supporters. Another example might be the use of Trojans and 
other malware: while most famously Stuxnet was used to hinder the Iranian nuclear programme, 
the German police have also been discovered planting malware on their own citizens’ computers to 
spy on them.II IRIS et al (2010) concluded that there was functional blurring of this nature in the 
following areas: 
− detection, identification and authentication 
− situation awareness and surveillance 
− risk assessment and modelling 
− communication 
− information management 
− positioning and localisation 
Given that for example, difficulties in communications between first responders to the 7/7 London 
bombings were criticised, why has this level of commonality not led to more joint procurement? 
Why does the demand side remain so fragmented? 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The British military even had to step in to provide security for the London 2012 Olympics after private security firm G4S failed 
to train enough security staff. 
II  This was reported widely on the internet. A reliable account can be found here on the New Scientist blog: 
http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2011/10/german-hackers-find-possible-g.html 
A EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY: FROM INNOVATION POLICY TO EXPORT CONTROLS P 3 4  
3.5.2   Civilian and Military Customers: Irreconcilable Differences in 
Procurement and Requirement Definition Practice? 
Firstly, it is important to stress that while (despite inter-service rivalries) there is one military 
customer in the shape of each state’s Ministry of Defence, internal security users are much more 
varied. To start with they are not all at the national level: security functions are often devolved 
down to regional and local operators often with a high degree of autonomy and devolved budgets. 
Moreover, security customers, although they are not the focus of this report are not all 
governmental. Corporate and private customers range from large infrastructure operators (like 
energy suppliers, airport operators) to small domestic customers. Some of these private customers 
will need to be involved in public disaster planning because they control critical infrastructures.  
This inevitably means that joined-up procurement, even before military customers are involved, is 
extremely complex. Moreover, differences between the ways in which EU states organise internal 
security mean that cross-border procurement is even more complex. It is not surprising that both 
IRIS et al (2010) and Masson and Marta (2011) identify relatively few examples of this happening 
even in single states. Two widely cited British examples of joined up procurement, the border 
security e-Borders initiative and the ‘Fire Control’ project to concentrate fire service infrastructure 
in nine regional centres, have both collapsed in failure. 
Perhaps more importantly though there are crucial regulatory differences and varying levels of 
requirements between civilian and military customers even when they are procuring similar 
products. The military or defence customers and the businesses that supply them operate in a 
highly unusual environment. Briani and Sartori (2011) summarise these conditions as follows: 
− Monopsony structure on the demand-side 
− Monopoly/oligopoly structures on the supply-side 
− High R&D intensity and long-term production cycles 
− Decreasing production costs 
− Public subsidies in the R&D phase 
− Associated spin-offs 
Perhaps most importantly, within the EU context, is the existence of article 346 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which, notwithstanding the 2009 ‘defence package’ of the directives on intra-EU transfers 
of defence and defence and security procurement, still largely protects defence equipment 
procurement from single market legislation.I This permits a degree of protectionism and subsidy 
that would not otherwise be permitted under competition legislation. As has already been 
discussed this is such a particular environment, that it is difficult for those used to working within 
such structures to adapt to more normal business environments and vice versa. Moreover, as 
interviewees at the European Defence Agency pointed out in 2012, military users do tend to 
require much more customised and higher-end equipment than other users, even if the equipment 
is similar, making joint requirement definition complicated. 
Given the 2009 procurement directive also covers security procurement, would it make sense for 
internal security customers to adopt military procurement behaviour insofar as it is legally 
permitted because like defence technology, this new type of security technology requires special 
treatment? This after all seems to be the assumption underlying much of the EU activity in this 
field, for example the commitment to explore limiting firms’ liability (European Commission, 
2012a). It is though a rather problematic assumption. The report has already discussed the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  See Eguren Secades (2011) for a full discussion of the limitations of these directives. 
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complexity in joined up procurement for internal security users in a single state, but even if this 
was to be overcome, would a security technology market be more efficient than the existing 
defence one? It seems unlikely that internal security customers would be prepared to accept the 
extraordinarily lengthy time from requirement definition to in-service that defence customers are 
resigned to, particularly if the necessary equipment is available to an acceptable degree off-the-
shelf. Similarly, the expense of this model of defence procurement is increasingly decried as 
unaffordable. Perhaps this lies behind the reluctance of national users to launch the type of 
coordinated and consolidated demand for security technologies that had been anticipated in 2003 
by both the European Commission and GoP report. 
3.6 Summary 
This section began by discussing the methodological problems of quantitatively defining what a 
variety of studies had observed to be a new security market segment, closely related to the 
development of the concept of homeland security as outlined in section 2, but with a close 
relationship to the defence sector. A working definition of this industrial segment was proposed as 
firms from a variety of industrial backgrounds offering technological products to governmental 
customers in response to security concerns. It did not therefore seek to exclude defence firms from 
the analysis, or to limit security concerns to specific issues, but did limit the products considered to 
technology-orientated ones and omitted the corporate and private security customer in favour of 
governmental actors. 
The second sub-section looked at the crossover between security and defence technologies. It 
began by pointing out that trends in defence research and development were likely to be similarly 
valid in another high tech sector with a government customer, namely that R&D was likely to be 
concentrated in relatively few states and that EU efforts to foster collaborative R&D to make up for 
this, were likely to struggle. The discussion moved on to look at the taxonomies developed to 
classify technologies and their associated equipment. It acknowledged the large degree of 
crossover between defence and security technologies with some caveats, but argued that the most 
important issue for the purposes of this study was their joint reliance on generic technologies, 
which made non-proliferation and export controls more difficult, and raised questions about issues 
like security of supply for the EU. 
The section moved on to consider the supply side. It concluded that defence firms enjoyed certain 
advantages in accessing the new market sector but that their success could not be guaranteed. The 
lack of government demand meant that the major systems integrators had developed different 
strategies, from developing security exports to concentrating on their defence portfolios. They had 
all positioned themselves to some extent to be able to enter an EU market if demand improved. 
Second tier suppliers had clearer cut decisions to make, depending on the usefulness or otherwise 
of their technologies to the new market, whereas for third tier suppliers, while their products could 
well be relevant, their business was rarely in any case entirely defence dependent. Non-defence 
firms, except in the areas of secure communications and ICT, were struggling. This was mainly 
because traditional security suppliers and SMEs were disadvantaged in dealing with government 
customers, but lack of demand made it difficult to draw lasting conclusions.   
Finally, the section discussed the difficulties of the fragmented demand side. While it was accepted 
that military and civilian security users cooperated on an increasing range of missions, and 
moreover, used very similar technologies albeit for different purposes, the sub-section argued that 
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it was not that simple to consolidate demand. Firstly, the complexity of bringing together a diverse 
selection of internal security users from both public and private sectors, and national, regional and 
local levels of government was discussed. Secondly, the specificities of the defence procurement 
environment were outlined, and the different regulatory frameworks for military and civilian 
procurement discussed. Finally, the question was asked whether consolidating demand was 
actually an attractive prospect for civilian users, if it meant adopting military customs.  
To conclude, although there are undeniably commonalities in terms of user requirements and 
technologies, substantial difficulties remain in consolidating the fragmented demand side. This 
means that while defence firms are well-placed to be involved in the security sector if this demand 
emerges, it may not offer a sufficiently inviting prospect. The question is to what extent member 
states in fact share the EU’s vision of the importance of this sector? The way in which EU activity 
evolved will shed light on why there is perhaps a mismatch between Commission objectives and 
those of the member states. 
A EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY: FROM INNOVATION POLICY TO EXPORT CONTROLS P 3 7  
4 Evaluation of EU Policies effecting the 
Security and Defence Industries  
4.1 Introduction 
The European Union is a comparative newcomer to the fields of security and defence. Until the 
advent of the European and now Common Security and Defence Policy and the broadening of 
internal security activity post 9/11, its involvement was limited. The European Commission has 
though long aspired to play a role in defence industrial policy regulation. It tried to gain influence 
via Single Market legislation, competition policy and regional policy. Its success however was 
decidedly limited and was confined to: 
− the administration of the Framework programmes for research and development, some of 
whose projects were dual-use, 
− approving major corporate mergers even if a defence dimension existed, 
− allocating regional development funds to areas affected by closing defence bases or failing firms 
(KONVER), and 
− in 1995 setting up a regime for the trade of dual-use goods within the EU (Taylor, 1997). 
The Council, prior to the establishment of the ESDP, had two working groups connected with 
armaments. The first was COARM, established in 1991, which attempted to harmonise export 
controls policies with respect to third countries. The second was POLARM, set up in 1995, which 
was an ad hoc working group on armaments policy (Colvin, 1998). The European Parliament was 
not involved. Historically, therefore European cooperation on issues connected to defence and 
security industry has taken place outside the EU, in NATO, the Western European Union or in other 
multi- and bilateral fora.  
This section of the report aims to critically assess EU policies to strengthen the competitiveness of 
European security and defence industries looking at their coherence and effectiveness. Given that 
EU powers in this area are relatively new, the section first outlines the legal basis for EU action. It 
then looks at Commission policy, considering the security research programme, sectoral 
competitiveness action, the defence package of directives and finally, the involvement of DG-Home 
Affairs in developing homeland security type policies. It then moves on to look at the European 
Defence Agency. The final substantive sub-section will consider related European activity outside 
the EU, namely, the Franco-British defence agreements, OCCAR, the Framework Agreement and 
NATO, and seek to evaluate what if any impact they have on EU policy success.  
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4.2 Legislative basis for EU action in the area of 
security and defence 
The legislative basis for EU actions in the areas of security and defence is quite complex and so is 
worthy of attention. This sub-section of the report will briefly outline the essence of the treaty 
basis for action on security and defence industries and technologies, through both the Common 
Security and Defence Policy and internal security clauses, and explain the significance of Article 346 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly Article 296) as a restriction on EU 
activity. It will also outline several key European Court of Justice rulings on the use of Article 346.   
4.2.1   Treaty basis and limitations 
The treaty basis for the Common Security and Defence Policy stems from Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU)I on the "General Provisions on the Union's External Action and Specific 
Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)", and more specifically Section 2, 
articles 42 to 46, entitled "Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)", as well 
as protocols 10 (on permanent structured cooperation in defence), 11 (on the WEU) and 
declarations 13 and 14 (which both stress that CSDP should not prejudice the specific character of 
the security and defence policies of the member states; 14 additionally states that no new powers 
are given to the Commission or Parliament). Of particular interest for this report, the provisions on 
the European Defence Agency say it will oversee the capability definition and development 
process, including having the aim to "strengthen the industrial base of the defence sector" and 
participate “in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy" (articles 42.3 and 45 TEU). 
There is however an important limitation to what the EDA or any EU institution can do to regulate 
the market in defence equipment, namely article 346 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, which reads, 
“The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules:  
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers 
contrary to the essential interests of its security;  
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, 
munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition 
in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.” 
This has been understood liberally as a “general and automatic exemption of hard defence material 
from the application of the treaty” (Trybus, 2000: 665) in part enabled by the secrecy surrounding a 
list of the products this exemption was meant to cover, which was compiled in 1958 and updated in 
1978.II Successive European Court of Justice judgments and a 2008 Commission directive have 
clarified the situation. These will be discussed in depth later. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The Treaty on European Union is available at: 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF 
II  The article 346 list can now be viewed at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st14/st14538-re04.en08.pdf. 
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The basis for action on internal security policy stems from the revised Treaty of Rome, now known 
as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)I, Title V ‘Area of freedom, security 
and justice’ (AFSJ). The amendments agreed under the Lisbon Treaty bring the AFSJ into the main 
body of the treaty and hence under normal community judicial controls. Lawyers, who have been 
critical of the rapid expansion of the policy area since 9/11, on the grounds that some moves have 
major implications for civil rights, which they feel have not been taken into account enough, have 
welcomed this, as the ability to take such measures to the ECJ where they seem to contravene the 
now legally binding Charter of Rights, will prove a check (Craig, 2010). It is also worth noting that 
article 4 (2) of the TEU states specifically that “national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State” and that the TFEU refers to internal security instead. This differentiation, 
viewed as important by some member states, was clarified during the negotiations of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Article 71 of TFEU states that a "standing committee shall be set up within the Council in 
order to ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened 
within the Union."  This committee is known as COSI. Article 72 TFEU however reads “This Title 
(Title V) shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.”  
4.2.2   ECJ judgments 
The European Court of Justice has been asked to rule on a large range of casesII where the 
defendant invoked Article 346 in their defence. The key judgments are briefly discussed below. 
While this is over-simplistic, the basic position of the Commission has been that derogations under 
Article 346 should be subject to a test of proportionality like any other derogation, whereas the 
member states have seen Article 346 as providing an automatic derogation. The position of the ECJ 
has been in general somewhere between these stances. Firstly, the Court has ruled in a number of 
cases that member states may use Article 346 to protect their sovereignty. In case C-252/01 
relating to a contract for Belgian coastal aerial photography, for example, the ECJ accepted the 
Belgian argument that the contract required special security measures, without requiring a high 
standard of scrutiny of whether security measures were needed. Similarly in case T-26/01 
regarding Fiocchi Munizioni, it was accepted that member states do have discretion in deciding 
how to protect their interests and what measures to use.  
However, the ECJ has consistently ruled that exemptions under Article 346 are limited. On Case 
367/89 Richardt for example it ruled that the derogation must be interpreted strictly and that only 
products actually listed in the 1958 list were exempt. Moreover in the Augusta Helicopters (Case 
337/05) ruling, it was clarified that article 346 only applied to equipment intended specifically for 
military use, so dual-use or equipment supplied to militaries for civilian use were not exempt. The 
ECJ has also ruled that there is no automatic exemption; article 346 only applies if the conditions 
are met (Case 273/97 Sirdar) and that it may only be invoked for reasons of security not economic 
reasons (Case 414-97 Spanish weapons). The 2009 rulings on the so-called ‘own resources’ cases 
(C284/05 and others) whereby member states tried to invoke article 346 as the rationale for their 
failure to disclose VAT revenue from arms imports to the Commission, also stressed that there was 
no automatic exemption. These rulings on Article 346 have informed the Commission’s action in 
the area of defence and security in recent years, and have strengthened their position. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU is available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF 
II  The judgments mentioned can be found at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/c2_juris.htm.  
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4.3 European Commission Policy  
The European Commission’s actions aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of security and 
defence industry are not based solely in one Directorate General, although DG Enterprise and 
Industry has specialist units for both security and defence industry. Work carried out by several 
DGs needs to be considered here, namely, DG-Enterprise and Industry (security research and 
sectoral competitiveness), DG-Internal Market and Services (defence package) and DG-Home 
Affairs (homeland security). DG-Information Society and Media has also some involvement through 
interests in cyber-security but its work is less relevant for the purposes of this report. Finally, DG-
Trade is responsible for the dual-use export legislation. The involvement of so many DGs reflects 
the need for the Commission to agree a common position on a topic with many facets. In recent 
years, the Commission has seemed to be more joined up in its approach to policy-making in this 
area. Earlier attempts in the 1990s to gain competence are thought to have failed because tensions 
between commissioners on whether it should be framed as an industrial policy or a single market 
competition issue, made it easier for the member states, who did not want Commission 
involvement to ignore the communiqués (Mörth, 2000).  
The Commission was aided though by two developments in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Firstly, 
the Prodi Commission included Commissioners Liikanen and Busquin, who were firmly convinced of 
the importance of the defence industry for Europe’s economic future and acted as policy 
entrepreneurs. The idea that Europe could solve its high technology problems by strengthening its 
defence industry seems to have been embedded in Commission thinking from this point onwards 
(Merritt, 2004: 216). This approach strengthened the support of industry for Commission 
involvement. Two important 2002 reports (STAR21 and ACARE) by lobby groups for aerospace and 
aeronautics made their case that technological innovation in the defence and aerospace fields was 
key to wider economic success for the EU.  Secondly, the decision to create the ESDP quickly drew 
attention to equipment and technology gaps and refocused political attention on the transatlantic 
gap. The crystallisation of the Commission’s thinking can be dated to 11 March 2003, when they 
released a communiqué about the industrial and market issues of European defence. The 
Commission proposed action in seven areas; standardisation, monitoring of defence-related 
industries, intra-community transfers, competition, procurement rules, export control of dual-use 
goods and research (European Commission, 2003a). As we will see the 2003 European Council 
decision to establish the European Defence Agency curtailed the Commission’s freedom of 
movement in proposing legislation but it is nevertheless clear that they have gained power since 
then. The announcement on 7 November 2011 by Michel Barnier, the Single Market commissioner, 
that the Commission had decided to launch a defence policy taskforce, which is likely to include the 
Internal Market, Research and Development, Industry, Transport, Energy and Legal Services 
Commissioners plus the EDA and European External Action Service, shows continued ambition.  
4.3.1   The genesis and evolution of the security research programme  
Parts of the European Commission’s DG-Research have long sought to fund defence-related 
research, but many member states, European parliamentarians and indeed some Commission 
officials have always opposed this on two grounds: a) defence remained a national prerogative and 
b) that the EU was a civilian not a military power and that it would therefore be inappropriate. 
However, while the Framework Research ProgrammesI have never formally been allowed to fund 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The EU Research Framework Programmes are the main vehicle through which the EU funds research. The programmes started 
in 1984. They are multiannual programmes (the first six lasted five years each, the current Seventh Framework Programme 
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defence-related research, increasingly over the years, dual-use research has been funded.I In 2003-
2004 though Commission supporters of defence-related research actively, notably Liikanen and 
Busquin, moved to make this a Commission task. Following a number of communiqués on cognate 
areas such as defence equipment (European Commission, 2003a) and aerospace industry 
(European Commission, 2003b), which claimed that the Commission should play a role in defence 
research. Under the heading “towards a more coherent European advanced security research 
effort”, the Commission (2003a) for example called for increased coordination of security research. 
It said it would ask national administrations, the business community and research institutions 
their opinions on what a European agenda for research in this field should look like and would seek 
“to launch a preparatory action to coordinate such research at the EU level, focusing on a limited 
number of concrete technologies linked to the Petersberg tasks”. At this stage the thinking seemed 
relatively clear; the Commission was attempting to move into defence research funding as a way of 
supporting the defence firms it deemed technologically vital to economic competitiveness. One 
Commission official went on the record to say “The EU’s framework program supports dual-use 
research in all these areas, so it would make sense to bump things over into the purely military 
realm… The important thing is to set the precedent” (Tigner, 2003a). In May 2003, meanwhile, 
another Commission official seemed to suggest that a major reorientation of the research budget 
was planned, saying that the development of a stronger European defence identity implied, “a 
more flexible use of EU research money in favour of defence-orientated projects”(Tigner, 2003b). 
However, the decision was taken by the European Council in summer 2003 to set up the European 
Defence Agency which inter alia would have responsibility for coordinating defence research. This 
made it very difficult for the Commission to openly try to fund defence research so instead it 
moved to security research. The Commission issued a communiqué in March 2004 on security 
research (European Commission, 2004) and a decision on implementing a preparatory actionII and 
on 15 March 2004 the Group of Personalities for Security Research (GoP), set up by the 
Commission, presented its report to Romano Prodi (see Figure 1 on p44). Edler and James (2012) 
stress the entrepreneurial role of the Commission in making this move, pointing out that there was 
no initial demand for this action from either the member states or industry. 
Subsequently, the Commission published the first call for proposals for projects and supporting 
activities under the new ‘Preparatory Action on the enhancement of the European industrial 
potential in the field of Security Research’ (PASR 2004) on 31 March 2004. This action spent 65 
million euros over three years and served as a pilot phase for the Commission’s broader agenda of 
establishing a separate security research programme to facilitate an EU security culture. The 
preparatory action was criticised for its lack of consultation with security usersIII, failure to map 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and its successors will last for seven years). Each Framework Programme has differed in the allocation of research priorities 
and how they should be funded. The current Framework Programme has four programmes: cooperation with ten research 
priorities (health; food, agriculture, fisheries and biotechnology; information and communication technologies; nanosciences, 
nanotechnologies, materials and new production technologies; energy; environment (including climate change); transport 
(including aeronautics); socio-economic sciences and the humanities; space; security), ideas (blue skies research funding 
allocated by the European Research Council, people (Marie Curie Actions enabling the mobility of researchers) and capacities 
(improving research and innovation capacity). Non-EU states can participate in the programme if they contribute to the 
budget. The following are associated with the current Framework Programme: Switzerland, Israel, Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Turkey, Croatia, FYROM, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Faroe Islands and Moldova. 
I  The security research priority as initially defined in the Commission’s proposals was rather ambiguous about its nature. 
However, during the co-decision procedure on the Seventh Framework Programme, the UK, France and Germany together 
with the European Parliament insisted that the civilian nature of the framework programmes be preserved. Formally 
therefore, the Security Research theme has an exclusively civilian focus (see Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European 
Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013)). 
II  Decision 2004/213/EC 
III  It is worth pointing out that only Austria and Sweden of the member states had felt it necessary to set up a national security 
research programme at this point – this may well have led the GoP to significantly overestimate demand. 
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onto agreed anti-terrorism priorities, lack of clarity in its objectives and seemingly rushed 
implementation (Hayes, 2006; Mawdsley, 2004). The security research priority in the seventh 
framework programme itself funded projects in four main mission areas backed up by three cross-
cutting themes: 
 
Mission areas: 
 
− “Increasing the security of citizens - technology solutions for civil protection, bio-security, 
protection against crime and terrorism;  
− Increasing the security of infrastructures and utilities - examining and securing infrastructures 
in areas such as ICT, transport, energy and services in the financial and administrative domain;  
− Intelligent surveillance and border security - technologies, equipment, tools and methods for 
protecting Europe's border controls such as land and coastal borders;  
− Restoring security and safety in case of crisis - technologies and communication, coordination 
in support of civil, humanitarian and rescue tasks”;  
Cross-cutting themes: 
 
− “Improving security systems integration, interconnectivity and interoperability - information 
gathering for civil security, protection of confidentiality and traceability of transactions;  
− Security and society - socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of security, ethics and 
values, acceptance of security solutions, social environment and perceptions of security;  
− Security research coordination and structuring - coordination between European and 
international security research efforts in the areas of civil, security and defence research.”I 
The research is mission-orientated and is largely development-orientated, rather than the type of 
“blue skies” research funded under the priorities managed by DG-Research. Some projects in fact 
seem to be more about procurement than research and development in so far that demonstrators 
have been produced (a late stage in the development of technology). It had an overall budget of 
€1.4 billion for the period 2007-13. The Commission hoped that the research priority would assist 
them in their wider aim of reducing fragmentation on both the supply and demand sides of the 
market, and becoming a market leader globally through EU standardisation exercises.II Throughout 
the preparatory stages and the early stages of the actual priority, the Commission carried out a 
process of public-private dialogue through advisory groups, which sat alongside the more usual 
comitology committeesIII for research programmes. These groups and their reports are briefly 
described in Figure 1 (p44). They are significant, and their composition matters, because the 
European Commission has largely adopted their recommendations in follow-up communiqués 
(European Commission, 2004a, 2009). Indeed this public-private dialogue appears to have largely 
determined funding priorities, although given the aims of security research, one might have 
expected this to be based on a scientifically rigorous risk assessment process. 
The call in the Group of Personalities report to spend at least €1 billion of additional money 
annually on security research now seems wholly unrealistic. Interviews with industry 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The outline of the security research priority can be found at: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/cooperation/security_en.html 
(consulted on 7 March 2011). 
II  Interviews with Commission officials in April 2008. 
III  There is also an official Security Research Advisory Group (SecAG) of experts, nominated by the Commission to guide the 
Commission in planning future security research programmes. Out of twenty members, the composition is seven large 
defence firms, three security firms, EDA, four end-users (Poland, Malta, Romania and Estonia), three research institutes 
(Finland, Israel, Netherlands), Swedish defence research agency and the Austrian Red Cross.   
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representatives suggested that the belief that member states would be prepared to match US 
homeland security spending and that it would be orientated in certain directions, was grounded in 
part at least in a ‘groupthink’ situation, based on shared fears from the Commission and European 
defence firms that billions of dollars flowing into US defence firms for the foreseeable future would 
leave European firms in a hopeless situation. In reality this was a misunderstanding (shared then by 
US firms - Beidel, 2011) of how the US homeland security funding would actually be spent.  
Firstly, homeland security in the US has been driven by events. Hurricane Katrina ensured that 
much of the early spending went to disaster response firms not defence firms. It was not until 2009 
that large defence contractors like Lockheed started getting really large contracts (Beidel, 2011). 
Large amounts are also spent on the Department of Homeland Security itself, which has gone from 
13 employees in 2002 to 60,000 in 2010. Secondly, it is now generally accepted that homeland 
security funding will not continue at the levels of the first decade given the US fiscal crisis. Beidel 
(2011) also argues that predictions that the security market would rival the defence one are 
“unlikely now, in part because of growing fiscal constraints and because the two markets are driven 
by different factors”. A combination of the realisation that mass surveillance and detection 
programmes have been very costly in terms of budgets and to business while providing little added 
security,I coupled with growing citizen resistance to intrusive security measures, has led to the 
cancellation of programmes such as the Advanced Spectographic Portal programme aimed at 
detecting smuggled nuclear material and SBI-net, a border control ‘virtual fence’. Moreover, Beidel 
(2011) suggests that with the exception cyber security, future US focuses will be on the integration 
of existing proven technology rather than the funding of new research. Hayes and Vermeulen 
(2012) argue that the European Commission is also failing to learn the lessons offered by the US 
experience in pressing ahead with funding for border surveillance projects, which closely resemble 
those that have failed at great expense in the US like the SBI-net. 
In addition to its own projects the security research programme has led to inter-institutional 
cooperation between the Commission and the EDA. Two projects in particular are seen as success 
stories by the EDA and the Commission. 
− Software Defined Radio which has applications both for military use and use by first responders 
(police, fire service and so forth).  
− a project on the insertion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into civil airspace (James, 2009a).  
This ad hoc cooperation led to the May 2009 decision by the European Defence Ministers to task 
the European Defence Agency to establish a European Framework Cooperation for Security and 
Defence together with the European Commission with the aim of “maximising complementarity 
and synergy between defence and civil security-related research activities”.II The EDA has identified 
situational awareness (sensor technologies, command and control of networked assets) as an area 
for cooperation (James, 2009a). Interviews in January 2012 with both EDA and Commission officials 
suggested that both parties saw this cooperation as positive. For EDA in particular, it was seen as a 
way of gaining access to additional funding.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Mueller and Stewart (2012: 107) calculate that for US homeland security spending to have been cost-effective, it would have 
had to “deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year. 
That would be about one a day.” The article claims that between 2001 and 2012 there were only 50 cases of Islamic extremist 
terrorism, most of which were small-scale. 
II  Council of the European Union, 2943rd External Relations Council meeting, Conclusion on European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), Brussels, 18 May 2009 
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Figure 1: Security Research Advisory Groups and their Reports 
Group of Personalities Report 2004 
Members - 27 members primarily from defence industrial or military backgrounds. Low 
representations of users. 
Key Recommendations 
− Commission security research programme should be established 
− 1 billion euro per year should be spent on security research by the Commission in addition 
to existing spending 
− Programme should fund capability-related research projects up to the level of 
demonstrators 
− There should be no division between civilian and military security research – synergies 
should be encouraged 
− Programme should foster industrial competitiveness & stimulate market development 
European Security Research Advisory Board Meeting the Challenge Report 2006 
Members - 50 members - mixture of government users (18), industry representatives (14) and 
some security experts - more defence-focused than might have been expected. 
Key Recommendations  
− Multidisciplinary, mission-oriented research on security should be undertaken covering 
capability development, system development and system-of-systems demonstration 
− Five demonstration programmes were recommended: aftermath crisis management; 
European-wide integrated border control; logistic and supply chain security; security of 
mass transportation; and CBRNE threats 
− Societal concerns about privacy and ethics should not be ignored in the effort to improve 
security 
− Security research system should be established using “innovative pre-commercial public 
procurement, the use of large-scale demonstration programmes, greater SME engagement 
and the definition and use of European standards” 
European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) Final Report 2009 
Members - 65 plenary members - all stakeholders represented including EU institutions. 
Additional members (c.600) mainly industrial figures took part in working groups. Little civil 
society representation. 
Key Recommendations 
− The human and societal aspects of security must be at the heart of security research and 
ethical and legal dimensions must be a part of security solutions. 
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− Industrial policy – overcome market fragmentation & strengthen security industrial base to 
become a leader in global security market 
− European Security Research and Innovation Agenda – 5 clusters 
o classic security cycle of preventing, protecting, preparing, responding and recovering; 
o countering of different means of attack; 
o securing critical assets/infrastructures; 
o securing identity, access and movement of people and goods; 
o cross-cutting enablers, in particular Information and Communication Technologies.  
 
− Need to consider in addition the external dimension of security in future 
− Continued public-private dialogue, coordinated trans-European cooperation and 
establishment of an Internal Security Fund 
 
Has the security research programme been a success? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
evaluate it from the Commission perspective, that of industry and that of Commission critics. 
Firstly, from the side of the Commission the security research programme has to be regarded at 
least as a partial success. It was popular. Interviews with DG Enterprise and Industry officials and 
industry representatives in January 2012 confirmed that the programme had been substantially 
over-subscribed. Moreover, the fact that security research will continue into the Eighth Framework 
Programme called Horizon 2020, under the heading ‘Inclusive, Innovative, and Secure Societies’ is 
indicative of a level of success, although the budget at this point is unclear. There have even been 
discussions about the possibility of funding defence research through the Framework Programmes.I 
The Commission was less successful in its market shaping aims though, especially on the demand 
side, as discussed earlier in section 3.  
From an industry perspective, interviews carried out in January 2012 had some interesting findings. 
For industry, the lack of subsequent demand from users was a major problem, as it made little 
sense to share technologies (or useful contacts to act as the user representative on the project) 
with project partners in the security research programme, if there was no contract at the end. This 
was a particular problem for firms based in countries where there was little research funding 
available but also no procurement, as they could apply for EU funding for the research stage but 
then there were no obvious continuation routes, as it was difficult to export with no existing 
customers, raising the question of research and development being wasted. The Commission, not 
being a customer, is limited in its ability to respond to this. It was also suggested that the need to 
put together bids that had geographical balance and SME representation, meant that suboptimal 
partners were being chosen.  
The Commission’s critics are harsher. For Hayes (2006; 2009; 2010) the security research 
programme represents a triumph for the lobbying of defence firms, who he claims were over-
represented in all of the advisory groups at the expense of genuine civil society voices. Jeandesboz 
and Ragazzo (2010) agree the public-private dialogue within the advisory groups was closed and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  It was proposed that defence research should be funded in the Horizon 2020 programme (the successor to the Seventh 
Framework Programme) but there was opposition within DG-Research and from member states. Edler and James (2012) 
suggest that this reverse suggests that there are limits to the Commission’s ability to move into this policy area. It is also not 
really clear that funding for defence research would add value. It is unlikely that sufficient funding would be allocated to make 
a difference, and the problem that the EDA has faced in not being able to assure procurement of the research it has funded, 
would also apply to the Commission. It would seem that EU research funding could be used more effectively in other areas. 
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limited, but have also collected an array of interesting data to support their further criticisms that 
the programme was geographically biased, was dominated by big defence firms and concentrated 
on controversial surveillance technologies. They claimed that the beneficiaries were 
disproportionately based in six countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Israel). 
Jeandesboz and Ragazzo (2010) also claimed that big defence firms are the overwhelming 
beneficiaries of the security research programme, and equate this with their over-representation 
on advisory groups. Their final claim is that the programme was too heavily focused on surveillance 
technologies, some of which are highly controversial in terms of civil liberties and privacy. They 
pointed out that projects for surveillance and detection up until May 2009 had taken up 40.1% of 
the budget, compared to the 1.09% spent on two projects reflecting on ethical and legal 
dimensions. They based their claims on an analysis of projects awarded prior to May 2009. This 
study has created a database of projects awarded up until July 2012 to re-examine the claims with 
more data. The data was taken from the CORDIS website.I 
After analysing the total number of projects coordinated by each state and their value (shown in 
graphs 1 and 2 below), it is clear that there is a concentration. The top six states by July 2012 in 
terms on number and value of projects funded were France, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. 
The French have been the most successful coordinating over 19% of the funds awarded thus far. 
Belgium has also done well, although it should be noted that numerically half of the projects 
coordinated are being coordinated by European-level organisations based in Brussels like the 
European Organisation for Security. Israel and Norway (non-EU states may participate in the 
Framework Programmes if they contribute to the budget) have performed strongly too. As might 
have been expected, there is a correlation between defence industrial strength and above average 
coordination rates. The top six are the six members of the Letter of Intent group. This suggests that 
the concern raised in section 3 about a potential geographical concentration in security research 
mapping onto the concentration in defence research has validity. The picture of overall 
participation may be more complex but as the amount awarded to each partner in projects is not 
given, more in depth analysis was not possible for this report. Given the concerns raised by 
interviewees from industry that Commission efforts to achieve a better geographical spread were 
forcing them to choose non-optimal partners, such analysis might also prove misleading about the 
whereabouts of security research expertise.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  CORDIS list of projects funded under the security research priority: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/projects_en.html  
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Graph 1: Number of Projects in the Security Priority of the 7
th
 Framework Programme Funded as 
Project Coordinator by Participating State (up to July 2012) 
 
Graph 2: Value of Projects Funded in the Security Priority of the 7
th
 Framework Programme as 
Project Coordinator by Participating State (up to July 2012) 
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Turning to the chief beneficiaries of the programme, the data shows a mixed picture. Four of the 
five firms in the list are either part of firms with a defence portfolio or are subsidiaries of defence 
firms. The top two beneficiaries (Thales and Indra) are firms with interests in both the defence and 
security sectors. Morpho (owned by Safran) and Selex Sistemi Integrati SPA (owned by 
Finmeccanica) trade in surveillance and detection technologies. Verint also produces surveillance 
and detection technologies but is associated more with law enforcement than defence. The other 
top ten recipients are the Swedish defence research agency, the Belgian Royal Military Academy, 
Germany’s Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft and the Dutch TNO research organisations (some of whose 
groups do defence research) and the French CEA, which does research into civil and military uses of 
nuclear power (and since 2010 alternative energy). In this sense, the picture is a little more mixed 
than Jeandesboz and Ragazzo (2010) claimed but given that the security research programme is 
intended to be civilian in nature, there is a surprisingly high defence presence. It should be noted 
that again the analysis looks at the funding per coordinator – in various cases, there is clearly a 
successor project coordinated by a different entity, but this factor could not be taken into account. 
Table 5: Top Ten Project Coordinators in Terms of Total Funding from the Security Priority of the 7
th
 
Framework Programme (until July 2012) 
Project Coordinator Total Value of Funding (Euros) 
Thales Communications and Security SA (France) 37640021 
Indra Sistemas S.A. (Spain) 35459846 
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Angewandten 
Forschung (Germany) 
31437774 
Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut (Sweden) 30806584 
Ecole Royale Militaire - Koninklijke Militaire School (Belgium) 30549645 
Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Toegepast 
Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek – TNO (Netherlands) 
22998389 
Selex Sistemi Integrati SPA (Italy) 22143064 
Morpho (France) 22048026 
Verint Systems Ltd (Israel) 21108212 
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives 
(France) 
18300468 
  
The final claim made by Jeandesboz and Ragazzo (2010) was that the programme was heavily 
biased towards surveillance and detection technologies at the expense of only two projects looking 
at the ethical and legal implications of security technologies. The majority of the projects funded 
under the categories ‘security of the citizen’, ‘security of infrastructures and utilities’ and 
‘intelligent surveillance and border security’ do feature surveillance and detection technologies. 
These three categories account for 48.5% of spending. While the funding dedicated to primarily 
social science projects is less, (unsurprisingly as they require less funding than technology projects), 
there have been fourteen projects funded, which appear to engage with legal or ethical 
implications. This is possibly an example of the Commission responding to and accepting earlier 
criticism, but the Commission (2012a: 5) commenting on societal reluctance to accept certain 
technologies, argues that:  
“The problems associated to the societal acceptance of security technologies results in a number of 
negative consequences. For industry it means the risk of investing in technologies which are then 
not accepted by the public, leading to wasted investment. For the demand side it means being 
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forced to purchase a less controversial product which however does not entirely fulfil the security 
requirements.”
I
 
This might be taken as evidence in favour of Jeandesboz and Ragazzo’s (2010) assertion that the 
Commission is not really engaging with the ethical and legal implications of security technologies. 
As has been argued above, extending the analysis to July 2012 paints a more mixed picture of the 
nature of the programme. Nevertheless, the Commission’s critics do seem to be correct to argue 
that the programme was heavily slanted towards certain types of technologies, firms and countries 
with strong defence industrial bases. This is not surprising given the genesis of the programme 
outlined above, but given the discussion in part 3 of the report about whether it was desirable or 
realistic to try to construct a homeland security market on the same lines as the defence market, is 
perhaps cause for concern. 
4.3.2   Policy actions taken by DG-Enterprise and Industry under the 
heading of sectoral competitiveness  
Between 2001 and 2004 the European Commission established a number of policy advisory groups 
looking at different industrial sectors connected with defence: STAR 21 on aerospace,II LeaderSHIP 
2015 on shipbuildingIII and the already discussed Group of Personalities on security and defence 
research and development, which aimed inter alia to strengthen their contacts with industry and 
thus gain support for Commission action in the defence and security sectors (Slijper, 2005). Even 
supporters of the Commission’s approach admit openly that, it “has set about recruiting allies in 
industry to reinforce its message” (Merritt, 2004: 238). The Commission also works closely with the 
Aerospace and Defence Industries of Europe (ASD) the main industry lobby group. ASD coordinates 
Commission funded research projects like SETRAS, a research study about enhancement of critical 
infrastructure protection measures and security standards. It also manages some cooperation 
projects with third countries for the Commission. The Commission’s work on security and defence 
industry competitiveness is beginning to be codified in communiqués and action plans. 
In July 2012 the Commission issued a communiqué on EU security industrial policy setting out an 
action plan to improve the competitiveness and innovation of European security industry. The 
communiqué accepts that there is no clear definition of the security industry and relies heavily on 
the work by Ecorys (2011) for its statistics on the value of it, even though that study acknowledged 
the limitations of the data. Contrary to earlier documents there is an acceptance that the security 
and defence markets are distinguishable as there are different end-users, requirements and 
applications, although this is rather oddly described as a fragmentation in itself (Commission, 
2012a: 8). Interestingly though it describes the industrial basis supplying the two markets only as 
‘not fully identical’ (European Commission, 2012a: 8), whereas (as discussed in section 3) other 
commentators have suggested a greater diversity. The features of the action plan are: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The original document contains a number of spelling mistakes. These have been corrected in the quotations. 
II  The STAR21 report can be accessed here:  ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/era/docs/report_star21_en.pdf  
III  The LeaderSHIP report can be accessed here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/maritime/documents/shipbuilding/index_en.htm  
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Overcoming market fragmentation by: 
− standardisation road maps 
− harmonised certification for airport screening equipment and alarm systems 
− exploiting synergies between security and defence technologies through hybrid standards 
Reducing the gap between research and market by: 
− aligning funding programmes (notably between Horizon 2020 and the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice) and using intellectual property rights to funded projects to test and validate them 
− encourage public users to fund technological innovation by the use of pre-commercial 
procurement rules 
− explore ways of limiting third party liability for firms 
Better integration of the societal dimension by: 
− societal impact checking during the R&D phase 
− introducing an industry standard for ‘privacy by design’ and ‘privacy by default’ for products. 
It is noticeable that the communiqué stresses the importance of export markets and the need to 
enable trade in security products not just within the EU but globally (the impact of this on export 
controls is discussed in section 5). It is also clear that the Commission is frustrated by member 
states’ reluctance to purchase the technologies the Commission has decided are necessary. The 
lack of interest of national administrations in security industrial policy is visible in the fact that only 
7% of responses to the consultation prior to the issuing of the communiqué came from member 
states – with only 59I responses in total, this equates to four of the twenty seven member states. 
The measures outlining the future use of the Commission budget for testing and validation and the 
pushing of pre-commercial procurement attempt to counter this. The reluctance of citizens to 
accept some security technologies, and deep differences between member states in attitudes 
towards privacy and rights is identified as a hindrance to industrial competitiveness as it can lead to 
wasted research.   
This is not just a problem of national differences though. The security research programme has 
allocated €13 million to the development of a functioning prototype of a "transportable 
autonomous patrol for land border surveillance" or "Talos." The system comprises two unmanned 
ground vehicles (UGVs), one to act as a spotter and the other to act as an interceptor of any 
suspects attempting to cross EU borders. The UGVs are connected to manned command units and 
the UGVs notify them that suspects have been intercepted and tracked. Non-lethal weapons could 
be added to the UGVs. The consortium, which includes an Israeli firm (Israeli Aerospace Industries), 
is seeking further EU funding to further develop the product. According to Nielsen (2012a) a 
spokesperson for Frontex thought it unlikely that the UGVs would be seen on EU borders but that 
“Israel might find them more digestible as border control devices”. This suggests that the societal 
impact checking proposed at the R&D stage needs to be rigorous. 
The Commission’s work on strengthening the competitiveness of defence industry has thus far 
been largely based around issuing communiqués (European Commission, 1996; 1997; 2003; 2007) 
and commissioning studies like IRIS et al (2010). The one major legislative act has been the 
directives known as the defence package adopted in 2009, which will be discussed fully in the next 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  51 responses came from businesses and business associations and four from NGOs. 
A EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY: FROM INNOVATION POLICY TO EXPORT CONTROLS P 5 1  
sub-section. The Commission though has considerable policy ambition in this field, and the 
announcement in November 2011 that it was setting up a defence policy taskforce is potentially 
significant. The taskforce will have four key missions:  
− “Ensuring that an EU defence procurement directive and an intra-EU defence products' transfer 
directive are transposed into member state legislation 
− Creating a debate in industry on determining the strategic areas where Europe needs to keep an 
industrial base and thereby retain strategic autonomy 
− Exploiting synergies between the security and defence industries 
− Ensuring coherence on security of supply issues” (Hale, 2011) 
At present though it is only possible to offer a preliminary assessment of the effects of the defence 
package in the next sub-section. 
4.3.3   Action to regulate defence and security procurement and remove 
barriers to intra-EU trade 
Issued in September 2004, the European Commission’s Green Paper on defence procurement 
(European Commission, 2004b) opened wide-ranging consultations with national governments, 
industry and security policy institutes to frame the best approach to injecting competition into 
Europe’s long-protected national defence markets. It set out two possible approaches:  
− A communication to clarify the limits of Article 296 
− A binding defence procurement directive to cover the procurement of items not included in the 
Article 296 list 
A third option, pushed initially by the British government but which rapidly gained support from 
many member states, also emerged during the consultation process: 
− A voluntary code of conduct regarding the use of the article, which would involve disclosure of 
all use of Article 296 and the reasons why a state had chosen to do so, administered by the EDA 
The EDA subsequently drafted such a code on behalf of national governments. The majority of the 
responses reacted rather unenthusiastically to the two Commission proposals, largely because as 
Schmitt et al (2005) point out, it was unclear how much impact, if any, the measures would have on 
top-end defence procurement, which is where for the member states the problem lies. The 
Commission’s measures would impact on procurement of those items not covered by the Article 
296 list, but the extent to which protectionism in this low-end procurement is really hindering 
intra-EU trade was and is unclear. Nevertheless the Commission produced first and interpretive 
communiqué on the application of what was then Article 296 (Commission, 2006) and then 
produced two directives that have become known as the defence package; Directive 2009/43/EC 
on intra-EU transfers of defence productsI and Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and security 
procurement.II The measures were proposed under Article 114 of the TFEU which allows legislation 
to be proposed to harmonise national legislation to improve the functioning of the common 
market. While the former should reduce bureaucratic hurdles for business,III it is the latter directive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Directive 2009/43/EC: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:146:0001:0036:EN:PDF 
II  Directive 2009/81/EC: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/full_text_of_directive_en.pdf 
III  It does however raise some potential problems for the adequate control of exports. This will be mentioned further in section 
5. See Depauw (2010) for a full discussion of the directive. 
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that may have considerable impact on the strength and competitiveness of European defence and 
security industry. The directive proposes that it establishes a specialist procurement regime for 
security and defence, which specifically addresses the difficult issues of security of supply and 
security of information, thus making it unnecessary to derogate from the regime by invoking Article 
346. There are two potentially important exemptions where the directive does not apply: 
government to government sales and multinational collaborative projects: (Eguren Secades, 2011). 
Moreover, the full extent of the directive is likely to only become clear in some years time through 
accumulated ECJ case law. There are likely though to be two main impacts, firstly on those 
countries with strong defence industrial bases and procure most products nationally, and secondly 
on those countries that are large arms importers and use offset agreements as an industrial policy 
tool. 
The concentration of both defence spending and industry in the same few member states, 
predominantly Britain, France and Germany means that much of the EU defence procurement in 
terms of total spend only involves these countries and their defence firms. The directive wishes to 
encourage open procurement to increase competition and affordability. However, there are two 
potential problems here. Firstly, research and development are excluded from the directive, but 
once the development phase is over, the contract should be tendered openly. This may be a 
disincentive for states to fund research, if there is no guarantee that the procurement contract 
would go to a firm from their country (Edwards, 2011). Secondly, while it is likely that member 
states will be able to declare some technologies vital to national security, such as those associated 
with nuclear weapons or complex weapons, and so make a case for those contracts to remain 
national, Edwards (2011) suggests that the Commission might insist on contracts being split for 
large platforms, with the non-sensitive part being openly procured. It is not clear that this would 
improve efficiency or affordability though. Moreover, if the Commission acts against these states, 
there is a very real risk that they will undermine European industry by having to open more 
procurement to American firms as there are few European alternatives. 
Secondly, there is an impact on countries who import defence and security products. Within the 
global arms trade, offsetsI are commonplace,II the Commission, however, feels that they distort the 
tendering process by shifting the focus for decision from the quality and price of the tenders to the 
offset deal proposed. While offsets are not forbidden in the directive, the Commission has made it 
clear that it will challenge their continued use. EU states can be divided into four groups on this 
matter. France and Germany import very little. Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, while 
net exporters, do import substantial amounts of equipment from the USA and usually attach 
indirect offset to such contracts. Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Spain import a lot from the 
EU and expect direct offsets. The rest have little defence industrial capacity and so favour civil 
indirect offset agreements (Edwards, 2011). It is the third group that has most to lose as they have 
been using offset to support indigenous and generally uncompetitive defence industry. The 
Commission has already begun to challenge the use of offsets. Its first challengeIII was to Greece 
over the public procurement contract for six submarine battery kits, whose call for tenders 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The USA defines offset as “Industrial compensation practices required as a condition of purchase in either government-to-
government or commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act and 
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.” The full definitions can be accessed here: 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/offsets/offsetsdefinitions.html 
II  Direct offset deals are based on products and services directly related to the equipment the purchasing state is buying (e.g., 
local co-production of parts of the purchased weapon system). These are predominantly military. Indirect offset deals, 
though, can be based on either military or civilian products/services unrelated to the specific defence equipment purchased. 
This can include foreign investment and countertrade. 
III  Press release IP/10/1558  can be accessed here: 
Http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1558&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage 
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included a requirement that 35% of the material used in the batteries should be produced in 
Greece. Although the Greek government claimed national security grounds (Article 346), the 
Commission decided the Greeks were in breach of EU rules on the basis as they had not explained 
why the use of standard EU public procurement rules would endanger Greek security interests. It 
should be pointed out that the case for offset use is not economically proven, but ending its use 
will probably have a deleterious impact on some defence firms in the countries affected 
(Mawdsley, 2008a). The second group of countries, who buy from the US, might also lose, as they 
have often used offset as a way to embed sub-contractors into lucrative US supply chains. The UK 
though has already abandoned offset for imports entirely (UK MoD, 2012), which suggests that the 
impact is not thought to be so great. 
To summarise, while it is undeniable that the directive may make the market more efficient, it is 
not clear that it will increase the strength and competitiveness of European defence industry. 
While the loss of some uncompetitive firms may be beneficial in the long-run, there are two 
significant risks. Firstly, that the directive has the unintended effect of increasing US market share 
in the EU, and secondly, that defence industrial capacities will be concentrated in even fewer states 
with the risk that this increases the number of states uninterested in funding defence R&D. 
Interviews with industry figures in January 2012 revealed that industry was very anxious about the 
effects, pointing out that it did nothing to consolidate demand. There is no guarantee that states 
that lose indigenous defence industrial capacity will ‘buy European’ subsequently, the US and 
Russia will be keen to offer their products, which may be more suitable than European alternatives. 
The directive also applies to sensitive security products but the impact is likely to be less severe on 
a market that is still immature. 
4.3.4   Development of ‘homeland security’ type policies and their 
associated technological needs by DG Home Affairs. 
In many ways the work of DG Home Affairs complements that of DG Enterprise and Industry. 
Parallel to the security research programme DG Home Affairs runs a Framework Programme on 
Security and Safeguarding Liberties, which is composed of two specific programmes: ‘Prevention, 
Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism’ and ‘Prevention of and Fight against 
Crime’. The total budget for the 2007-13 cycle is €740 million. This programme aims to support 
“operational, highly specific and policy-oriented activities”.  In particular the terrorism programme 
has a focus on protecting critical infrastructure that has commonalities with the aims of the 
security research programme. 
Schengen states can also apply for funding to the External Border Fund, which aims to offer 
financial solidarity to those member states, for which “the implementation of the common 
standards for control of the EU’s external borders represents a heavy burden”.I States can apply to 
upgrade border surveillance equipment including equipment ships and helicopters with the Fund 
financing up to 90% of some projects although 80% appears to be the most common. Overall,       
€1 820 million was allocated for the Fund over the financial period 2007–13. Particularly for those 
states affected badly by the financial crisis, this fund offers a heavy subsidy for the purchase of 
some internal and external security equipment. For the next budget cycle 2014-20, the Commission 
has proposed establishing an Internal Security Fund with funding of €4648 million, to assist in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  For information on the External Borders Fund see: http://ec.europa.eu/home-
Affairs/funding/borders/funding_borders_en.htm  
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implementation of the internal security strategy.I This is planned to be the financial support 
instrument for “police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management” and 
external borders and visas, so effectively bringing together the two programmes already discussed. 
The Commission communiqué on their budget plans specifically aims to fill the gap between the 
security research programme and procurement. “In addition, funding is made available for 
particularly innovative projects which aim at developing new methods or technologies, especially 
the testing and validating of the outcome of EU funded security research. This will help close the 
gap between the research results achieved with support from the 8th Framework Programme and 
their serial application in practice for the benefit of the law enforcement community.” (Commission, 
2011: 7) There are also links through the proposed EUROSUR border surveillance system that for 
instance suggests that “European research and development programmes could be targeted 
towards improving the performance of surveillance tools and sensors (e.g. satellites, unmanned 
aerial vehicles / UAVs, etc.)” (European Commission, 2008).II The European Commission (2012a: 9) 
communiqué on security industrial policy also explicitly states that the Internal Security Fund can 
be used to fund the testing and validation of funded security research projects. It appears that even 
if the member states are not convinced of the need to increase their demand for internal security 
technologies, as discussed in part 3, the European Commission is doing its upmost to maximise the 
market. 
4.4 European Defence Agency  
The European Defence Agency’s role is defined as follows: 
“The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, 
shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where 
appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base 
of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, 
and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities”. (TEU Article 
42(3)) 
It is therefore the EU institution, which is most obviously tasked with ensuring the strength and 
competitiveness of the European defence industrial and technological base (EDITB). Given that the 
EDA is intended to give strategic direction to the EU’s armaments efforts, it seems worth analysing 
its statement on the shape of the European defence industrial base of the future (2007) to see 
whether they have been able to produce coherent and viable policy directions. Accepting that 
harmonization of the demand side is needed to facilitate consolidation of the supply side, the EDA 
(2007) states that EDITB should be: 
− Capability-driven (that is, focussed on meeting the real operational requirements of the Armed 
Forces of the future, whilst sustaining the necessary levels of European and national operational 
sovereignty); 
− Competent (denoting in particular the rapid exploitation of the best technologies); and 
− Competitive (both within and outside Europe). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  EU Internal Security Strategy: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/113055.pdf 
II  For an extremely critical report on both the initiatives and the European Commission’s failure to question the claims made by 
firms about their equipment, see Hayes and Vermeulen (2012). 
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The EDA suggests that to achieve this, there needs to be more consolidation, work-sharing and 
interdependence on an EU basis, centres of excellence (with appropriate regional distribution), 
greater integration into the civilian industrial base, with “less European dependence on non-
European sources for key defence technologies” but without resorting to a Fortress Europe 
approach (EDA, 2007). However, while these aims may be laudable it is clear that significant further 
consolidation will produce monopolies rather than competition (Hartley, 2006), and that regional 
distribution (while desirable) ignores the realities of the state of the EDITB (Mawdsley, 2008b). In 
reality as Hartley (2011) points out there is still excess defence industrial capacity in the EU, and 
these firms should not be artificially shielded. In many ways the EDA has inherited the almost 
impossible task of reconciling the ambitions of big and small arms producing states and between 
Fortress Europe and free market enthusiasts, which stalled progress within WEAG. They must also 
do this in a time of financial austerity, where increasing numbers of member states no longer carry 
out defence research according to EDA’s own statistics, and where defence expenditure is falling. 
The EDA is also hampered by trying to develop a policy without adequate data; as Hartley argues 
there are “major data limitations: gaps in the data mean that it is not possible to obtain the 
statistics needed for an adequate economic evaluation of the individual sectors of the EDTIB.” 
(Hartley, 2011: 96-7) 
The EDA’s biggest problems though are twofold. Firstly, it lacks the budget to really provide the 
incentives for member states to get involved.I Secondly, British support has been lukewarm from 
the start and the country is currently evaluating whether to remain a participant. As early as 
November 2006 when the EDA Steering Board launched a three year €54.23 million force 
protection research programme, the UK declined to take part. France too seems less convinced 
that the EDA can deliver what it deems vital for its own DITB. Without the active support of the two 
biggest spenders on defence research and procurement, it is difficult to see how the EDA can be 
expected to make substantial progress. Like the Commission, the EDA is not a customer, so it 
suffers from the same problem that even if it sponsors technology development to demonstrator 
stage, it cannot force member states to procure the equipment, thus dis-incentivising stronger 
firms from sharing technologies. It is therefore limited in what it can really do to strengthen the 
EDITB. This is not to say that the European Defence Agency has achieved nothing useful. It has set 
in play various projects with real military utility. In establishing a voluntary code of conduct on 
opening up defence procurement, it paved the way for the Commission directive. Moreover, its 
work on offsets has injected some valuable transparency into European practices. 
While Commission and EDA cooperation has now been codified in the European Framework 
Cooperation for Security and Defence, and generally appears to be working well, there are also 
problems in reconciling the Commission’s ‘European Defence Equipment Market’ (EDEM) 
approach, which aims to apply as much single market logic as possible to the defence market (as 
has already been discussed with the procurement directive), and the need to retain an EDITB. 
Hartley (2011) summarises the key difficult choices that need to be made thus: 
“i) Conflicts between the EDEM and EDTIB. Choices are needed either to restrict competition to 
firms from Member States only or whether to allow other firms from the rest of the world to enter 
EU defence markets (e.g. US defence firms). Competition might also threaten key defence industrial 
capabilities and the appropriate regional balance of capabilities needed for the EDTIB. In the 
absence of competition, privately-owned monopoly defence firms will have to be treated as 
regulated firms with the associated problems of determining prices, efficiency and profitability. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Although the budget has risen steadily, in 2010 it was still only €31 million. 
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ii) Maintaining key specialised defence industrial capabilities during troughs in development and 
production work. These are specialist firms with no alternative uses for their plant and human 
capital but which are needed in the future (e.g. capability in nuclear-powered submarines; main 
battle tanks; aircraft carriers). Such specialist capabilities might be prime contractors or small and 
medium enterprises in the defence industry supply chain. Selecting which key capabilities to retain is 
only the starting point. Further issues arise about how to retain such capabilities (e.g. interim 
orders; mothballing of plants, etc.), the costs of alternative retention policies, who decides and who 
will pay.” (Hartley, 2011: 111) 
These are decisions that will be politically very difficult, and will require a level of intra-institutional 
cooperation that will not be easy. 
4.5  EU Member States  
 
Although for some, the European Union is now regarded as the natural home for defence and 
security industrial policy-making, it is challenged by a number of other actors. Firstly, a growing 
number of important states like Germany, the UK and France have made it clear that they regard 
CSDP as a vehicle for crisis management rather than for defence (Auswärtiges Amt, 2012; Haine, 
2011). The 2010 Franco-British Lancaster House agreements in particular have the potential to 
reshape the defence industrial scene. Secondly, there are a number of multilateral initiatives that 
remain outside the EU such as OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe pour la Coopération en matière 
d’Armement) and the Framework Agreement. Finally, NATO is involved in counter-terrorism 
cooperation and countering cyber warfare. 
4.5.1   Key Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
It is important to stress the continuing presence of multilateral and bilateral defence cooperation. 
There are a number of formal groupings like the highly developed Northern Defence Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO) and the increasingly active Visegrad Group, which aim to improve capabilities by 
closer cooperation between a small number of like-minded states. The 2010 Franco-British 
agreements on defence cooperation appear though to be particularly important as they seem to 
set certain parameters for future European armaments cooperation. It is worth outlining the extent 
of what was agreed because of the focus on conventional and nuclear weapons. Within the 
framework of two legally binding treaties, both states committed themselves to extending the 
cooperation between their armed forces and to joint development of their nuclear weapons 
technology, marking a step change in the level and depth of their bilateral cooperation. Alongside 
the ground-breaking treaty on nuclear cooperation, the establishment of a joint expeditionary 
force and various pooling and sharing measures, London and Paris also agreed extensive defence 
industrial cooperation.  
The agreed cooperation in the fields of defence technology and industry is also based on congruent 
strategic considerations that have been developed over many years.I The ten year plan for 
cooperation in the field of complex weapons, to be started in 2011 with the development of the 
anti-surface missile FASGW(H)/ANL, an assessment of enhancements to the Scalp/Storm Shadow 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  An Innovation and Technology Partnership was launched in 2007 by both countries to look at synergies in complex weapons 
research and requirements. 
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cruise missiles, and a joint technology roadmap for short range air defence technologies, showed 
the importance for both states of improved industrial cooperation. In order to develop cooperation 
between British and French defence firms, funding for joint research and development projects of 
€100 million annually has been agreed. Chick (2011) suggests that maintenance of defence 
industrial capacities is central to the Franco-British cooperation. Further agreements in both 2010 
and 2012 on cooperation on MALE drones and on Future Air Combat Systems could lead to a 
government-sponsored consolidation of that market segment, leaving other European states 
outside (Kempin, Mawdsley and Steinicke, 2012).I 
Paris and London could have decided to carry out the agreed projects within the EU framework of 
permanent structured cooperation, which offers the possibility for member states to cooperate 
flexibly in the defence field. Their decision not to shows the low level of expectations both 
countries have of meaningful progress in CSDP capabilities cooperation, and particularly the 
frustration that France has felt since they failed to secure adequate progress during their 2008 EU 
presidency and in the aftermath of the Chad mission (Haine, 2011). This attitude will also have 
consequences for the European Defence Agency (EDA). It seems that both states’ unhappiness with 
the level of progress made by the EDA in the realisation of urgently needed military capabilities, 
has led them to cooperate outside the EU institutions. This decision by France, in particular, which 
until now has been the leading nation in its consistent support of the EDA’s work, is likely to 
weaken the EDA. Britain and France have not rejected EU armaments cooperation but have made it 
clear, that it must be on their terms. It is also to be expected that they will be resistant to any 
involvement of the Commission in defence if it is seen to risk their defence industrial capacities. 
It is also worth considering the Framework Agreement on defence industrial restructuring (UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain) and the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en 
matière d'ARmement (OCCAR – UK, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Spain), not because they 
are likely to significantly impact on EU action, but because their experience in this area is 
illustrative of some problems that the EDA and potentially the Commission will face.  The 
Framework Agreement came to fruition through what was known as the Letter of Intent (LoI) 
process, signed up to in July 1998 by the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Spain, Italy, 
Sweden and the UK. This process tried to develop a framework of co-operation to facilitate the 
restructuring and operation of the West European defence industry as well as assisting an industry-
led restructuring of both the aerospace and defence electronics sector. In 2000, the same Ministers 
signed the Framework Agreement which agreed measures for improving co-operation on 
harmonisation of military requirements, security of supply, export procedures, research and 
technology, handling of classified information and the treatment of technical information. Work 
within the Framework Group has continued since the establishment of EDA and some useful steps 
agreed, but the cooperation has not led to joint procurement projects. Interestingly even among 
the states with the most defence industrial activity, a 2005 report to the Framework Agreement 
states found little evidence of fragmentation and duplication and moreover, that only 7% of 
defence technologies considered were common priorities for all six states. There was though 
bilateral commonality in 74% of technologies (UK MoD, 2006:35).This brings into question whether 
the EU analysis of market fragmentation and duplication is accurate but perhaps more importantly 
shows how difficult it will be to find research and procurement projects that all the large arms-
producing states would be prepared to sign up to. 
OCCAR is a management agency for collaborative defence procurement programmes. An 
agreement establishing administrative arrangements for cooperation between EDA and OCCAR and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Italian protests to the Commission about the Franco-British cooperation being anti-competitive were rejected (Kington, 2011). 
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on the exchange of classified information has been blocked by Greece and Cyprus in the Council 
since 2009. OCCAR was intended to manage collaborative defence procurement projects on a much 
more commercial basis, drawing on best practice in procurement from the private sector and as an 
arms length agency essentially depoliticising the process. The A400M was the first project to be 
subjected to this commercial approach and results have not been good. This has led the British and 
the French to conclude that the sustainability of their DITB is not something to be risked by 
cooperation with partners less serious about it than themselves (House of Commons, 2010; 
Masseret and Gautier, 2009). Although OCCAR itself is still thought worthwhile, the experience of 
the A400M project might make it difficult to persuade key states to participate in large scale 
procurement projects for CSDP if they are open to all EDA member states. 
4.5.2   Is NATO relevant? 
As Haine (2011) points out NATO remains of central relevance to discussions of European security 
and defence, as despite US ambivalence, it, with Franco-British leadership, rather than the EU, 
became the central actor in the Libyan operation of 2011. More specifically for the purposes of this 
report, it is also involved in counter-terrorism cooperation and countering cyber warfare. This short 
overview seeks to outline what overlap there is between NATO and EU actions with regards to the 
role of industry and technologies in these areas. 
One obvious area of overlap is between NATO’s Smart Defence, which tries to enable states to 
jointly purchase equipment and the EU Ghent Initiative on pooling and sharing of military 
capacities. Both aim to improve European military capabilities.  However, Maulny (2012) argues 
that unless the modalities of cooperation between the different schemes are agreed, then there is 
a risk that they undermine each other. Maulny (2012) offers competition between the EU and 
NATO on air-to-air refuelling pooling as an example.  
As far as counter-terrorism is concerned there also appears to be potential overlap between 
NATO’s Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) programme and European Commission and EDA initiatives 
in the field of security and defence technology development. The DAT programme is based on 
scientific research and testing of counter-terrorism technologies. NATO and the EDA do though 
work together to avoid duplication of research and DAT is a purely military programme. It is 
focused on ten areas, each led by a lead nation, where analysis suggests technology can help: 
− Reducing the vulnerability of wide-body civilian and military aircraft to man-portable air 
defence missiles (MANPADs) (UK) 
− Protecting harbours and ships using sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid reaction 
capabilities and unmanned underwater vehicles (Italy / Portugal) 
− Reducing the vulnerability of helicopters to rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) (Bulgaria / 
Greece) 
− Countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs), such as car and road-side bombs, by their 
detection and disruption or neutralization (Spain) 
− Detecting, protecting against and defeating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons (Czech Republic).  
− Technologies for intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (IRSTA), with 
the goal of developing improved tools for early warning and identification of terrorists and their 
activities (Germany) 
− Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) (Slovakia)  
− Technologies to defend against mortar attacks (DAMA) (Norway) 
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− Protection of critical infrastructure – now an overarching project within the DAT programme, 
integrated into the Portugal-led harbour protection programme  
− non-lethal capabilities (Canada)I 
This work programme was approved in June 2004 and should not overlap with current Commission 
activity on security research, as this is intended to be civilian. However, as the Commission’s 
security industrial policy and its Defence Task Force both intend to draw on synergies between 
security and defence industries in the future, the potential for conflict exists. There are also areas 
of overlapping interest in cyber security and cyber warfare. One area where NATO could be useful, 
is if it was to be used as a forum for the exchange of technological information between the US and 
EU on which homeland security projects were viable. The US Department of Homeland Security is 
currently prevented from engaging in such exchanges, but if this were to change, NATO might be 
an acceptably secure arena (Committee on Homeland Security and Export Controls, 2012). As some 
of the research funded by the European Commission looks similar to projects cancelled by the US 
as ineffective, this could save money (something that given the financial crisis is crucial).   
4.6 Summary 
This section of the report has first outlined the legal basis for EU action. It then looked at 
Commission policy, considering the security research programme, sectoral competitiveness action, 
the defence package of directives and finally, the involvement of DG-Home Affairs in developing 
homeland security type policies. It then moved on to look at the European Defence Agency. The 
final substantive sub-section considered related European activity outside the EU, namely, the 
Franco-British defence agreements, OCCAR, the Framework Agreement and NATO, and sought to 
evaluate what if any impact they might have on EU policy success. 
The Commission, despite long aspiring to be active in the sector, has only really become an actor in 
the last decade, and the first directives are only now being transposed into national law. At 
present, it is not clear whether the member states will allow it to expand its role further (despite its 
clear intentions to do so), and opinions are divided on whether there is a legal basis for it to move 
further onto the terrain of national security. Equally, its actions on internal security are both 
enabled and challenged by the Lisbon Treaty, as it seems likely that the hitherto emphasis on 
surveillance technologies is likely to meet legal challenges. The Commission seems to have the 
same diagnosis for both the defence and security markets, namely:  
− The supply side is too fragmented. Industrial consolidation and mergers are required in all 
sectors 
− The demand side is also too fragmented and both national procurement regimes and 
requirements need to be harmonised. 
It is these beliefs that guide its actions. However, its critics argue that it should not assume that the 
security and defence markets are essentially interchangeable, and that policy needs to be more 
nuanced. They also argue that the Commission has been guilty of taking a technology-centric and 
defence industry focussed approach to the more nuanced needs of the internal security user 
community (and paying insufficient attention to ethical concerns about its agenda). The 
overestimation of the demand from users, given the Commission cannot (despite its best efforts 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  For more information on the DAT programme, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50313.htm.   
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through the External Borders Fund) act as a customer, suggestions that such interactions need to 
be strengthened in the next Framework Programme if research is not to be wasted. The main 
problem with the emergence of the security research field, is potentially that the Commission’s 
entrepreneurial attempts to extend its policy competences, have led to a disconnect between what 
the Commission and industry would like to see, and what member states and EU citizens are 
prepared to countenance. This could lead to unintended consequences. Similarly, it is possible that 
its efforts at reforming the demand side of the defence market, through the procurement market, 
may have detrimental impacts on the EDITB depending on how it is enforced.  
The European Defence Agency has been set a near impossible task of reconciling contradictory 
member state wishes, without an adequate budget, and without the support of one (and 
increasingly more) key member states. Unsurprisingly, while some of its projects are undeniably 
useful, it has not been able to reconcile these differences. The questions of how to reconcile the 
contradictions between market-driven and protectionist approaches, and how to maintain key 
EDITB capacities when there is little demand, cannot remain unanswered for much longer despite 
the difficult political compromises that will inevitably need to be made. As Hartley (2011) points 
out, European defence firms are not particularly competitive when compared to their US 
counterparts. Nor can it be assumed, as some have optimistically thought that security industry 
and demand will offer an easy diversification route. 
The biggest challenges to the EU’s capacity to make policy to strengthen the competitiveness of 
European security and defence industries come from outside the EU institutions. Here there are 
two main issues. Firstly as NATO becomes more active in counter-terrorism, there is a risk that an 
alternative transatlantic agenda emerges, which could potentially duplicate or contradict 
Commission actions, although as argued above, it could also be helpful in avoiding duplication and 
wastage. Secondly, the Franco-British agreements on defence open up the possibility of an even 
more concentrated state of procurement and research expenditure and industrial power in both 
defence and security, which will be antagonistic to any attempts at regulation. However 
unpalatable this might be however, to those preferring action at the EU level, it might also be the 
case that the two states are correct in their calculations that this is the only way to preserve 
sufficient industrial, technological and military capabilities to make any European security action 
feasible.  
It is though that the Commission is the pivotal actor at present. If it is to continue to expand its 
competence unchecked though, it needs to be more realistic about what member states can spend 
on security and defence in a time of fiscal crisis, and to be much more aware of the ethical issues 
surrounding security. In questioning the negative emphasis that supporters of the EU as a civilian 
power put on the development of ESDP, Bailes argued that: 
“The real issue is not so much about ‘militarization’ of the Union as about an increasingly salient 
securitization of its entire identity and image, which the EU as a conscious organism is not yet 
equipped to recognize, let alone to handle maturely, and from which the ESDP’s small do-gooding 
adventures can come almost as a relief.” (Bailes, 2008: 119) 
There is a real sense that this might be an accurate description of the Commission’s activities in the 
security field, in that there seems to be a failure to consider the acceptable balance between 
human rights and security, which leads to a growing gap between the EU’s activities in this area 
and its foreign policy statements. This is immediately visible when we consider the question of 
export controls on security technologies.  
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5 Security Technologies and their Impact 
on Strategic Goods Export Controls 
5.1 Introduction 
The Arab Spring raised new questions about the adequacy of EU arms export control regulations, 
but as Bromley (2012: 14-5) puts it “some of the more damning revelations concerning exports from 
EU member states to the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings 
have concerned transfers of surveillance software and other types of technology for monitoring 
regime opponents”.I These reports have turned policy-makers’ attention to the question of how 
one might monitor and control such technologies. The European Parliament’s efforts in 2011 to 
amend Council regulation 428/2009 on the export of dual-use technologies,II to include such 
technologies were only partially successful, but the inclusion of restrictions on the export of 
telecommunications technology and equipment to enable surveillance in 2012 EU sanctions on 
both Syria and Iran, suggests that the issue has continued political salience.   
The renewed debate around the control of security technologies has reopened a difficult issue for 
the EU. The Code of Conduct on arms exports, which later became a Common Position, was initially 
intended to contain a third list (alongside the military list and the dual-use list) covering security 
and police equipment. Bauer (2003) claims that arguments over legal competence, definitions and 
methods of control meant that this list was not added. Instead a weaker (in terms of the 
equipment covered) and more specific regulation, known as the Torture Regulation, was agreed in 
2005. This means that security technologies and products are partially covered – some fall under 
the military or dual-use list and others are covered by the Torture Regulation – while others are 
controlled at a national level only, but the legal situation is not as clear as it might be. Bromley 
(2012) claims that one group of security technologies used for surveillance and detection is not 
covered at all, which has enabled their export and misuse during the Arab Spring.III 
Although attention was drawn to the problematic nature of the trade in surveillance technologies 
as early as 1995 by Privacy International (1995), prior to the Arab Spring the export of surveillance 
and other security technologies had not attracted much attention from either civil society or 
legislators, with the exception of a few reports from NGOs like Amnesty International and the 
Omega Foundation who have campaigned on the issue (Amnesty International and Omega, 2010; 
Amnesty International, 2011). Indeed, rather than being seen as a problem, some states, 
particularly Germany, have come to view the security technology sector as a major export 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  See inter alia Wagner (2012a) and Timm and York (2012). 
II  This defines dual-use items’ as “items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military 
purposes, and shall include all goods which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, Council of the European Union, Regulation 428/2009 
setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, Brussels,  5 May 
2009: Article 2 (1) 
III  It is not entirely clear whether this is correct. In August 2012 in a response to a letter from Privacy International the UK 
government stated that it had informed Gamma International, the makers of Finspy surveillance software, that it requires 
licences for all non-EU exports as the product used controlled cryptography covered by category 5 part 2 of the dual-use 
legislation. It seems likely that this would apply to other similar products (Privacy International, 2012) 
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opportunity (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2010).I Indeed, the European 
Commission (2012a: 2) even after the Arab Spring states, in support of its view that there needs to 
be an EU brand for security technologies, that: “the central future markets for security technologies 
will not be in Europe but in emerging countries in Asia, South America and the Middle East.” 
Indeed, the communiqué on security industrial policy suggests a desire to liberalise trade still 
further rather than restrict it (European Commission, 2012a). This clash of approaches to this 
matter suggests that political agreement will be difficult to find. The rest of this introduction will 
briefly outline how and why the issue of the control of security technologies has regained political 
salience. 
While more conventional policing technologies such as water cannon and tear gas are often used 
to suppress political demonstrations, political attention has been drawn recently to software used 
to track activists or disrupt communications technologies. The terms twitter / facebook / wikileaks 
revolutions have been applied to a number of protests and uprisings since 2009, notably with 
respect to the 2009 Moldovan civil unrest, the Iranian election protests in 2010 and the Tunisian 
and Egyptian uprisings in 2010 and 2011, which formed part of the group of uprisings known as the 
Arab Spring. The use of social media to both exchange information within the states and to 
publicise what was happening to the outside world, was feted in the media, almost to the extent 
that the underlying causes of the protests were neglected.II However, the media attention to the 
use of social media also meant that attention was paid to the way in which the internet was 
censored, and surveillance technologies used to track protestors in the regimes’ attempts to stop 
the demonstrations.  As Wagner (2012a) details there is a growing evidence base to show how 
deep packet inspection technology is used to censor the internet across a large number of states in 
the Middle East and North African (MENA) region (and beyond). Additionally, there is evidence that 
many states in the region maintain surveillance infrastructures (Wagner, 2012a). Use of both types 
of technology was made during the Arab Spring to filter the information available to citizens (e.g. 
external news coverage) but more worryingly to identify and imprison social media activists. A 
Bloomberg investigation uncovered evidence that some activists caught through these methods 
were tortured (Elgin Silver and Zschiegner, 2011).  
Much of this technology and the technical expertise to maintain it had been exported to the MENA 
region by US and EU firms. The Bloomberg investigation implicated the following EU firms: Nokia 
Siemens Networks (Finland), Ericsson AB (Sweden), ETI A/S (Denmark), AdaptiveMobile Security Ltd 
(Ireland), Creativity Software Ltd (UK), Amesys (France), Qosomos SA (France), Trovicor GmbH 
(Germany), Ultimaco Software AG (Germany) and Area SpA (Italy) (Elgin, Silver and Zschiegner, 
2011).  Wagner (2012) also identifies the activities of French firm Wanadoo in Tunisia and Gamma 
International (UK) in Egypt as problematic. A New York Times report also implicated Gamma 
International in sales of surveillance software, known as Finspy, used to monitor activists in 
Bahrain, Brunei and Turkmenistan (Perlroth, 2012). Recent Wikileaks releases have also shown that 
Italian firm Finmeccanica sold communications technologies to the Syrian police until 2012 (Clark, 
2012). As the negative press coverage spread, it initiated discussions in the EU member states and 
in the European Parliament about how and if the export of such technologies should be regulated. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Germany chose security technologies to be one of four fields to benefit from a export market expansion support programme 
for SMEs starting in 2012:  Auslandsmarkterschließung für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen – official document accessed 21 
July 2012 at: 
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Aussenwirtschaft/Aussenwirtschaftsfoerderung/aussenwirtschaftsfoerderunginstrumente,
did=193980.html 
II  Other more analytical accounts have stressed the need not to overstate the contribution of social media (Comninos, 2011; 
Morozov, 2011). 
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This background has meant that the renewal of the debate on how and whether to control the 
export of security technologies has had a particular focus on surveillance technologies. 
It is helpful at this juncture to return to the discussion on security technologies in section 3 of this 
report. The report has already argued that military and security products increasingly draw on the 
same range of generic technologies, particular ICT technologies, which are in wide use within the 
civilian sector. This does blur the boundaries around both knowledge production and the 
application of the technologies, not just between military and non-military security products, but 
with wider civilian and commercial technology innovation (James, 2009b). It clearly also brings new 
challenges to non-proliferation agendas, and to the design of effective control regimes for both 
tangible and intangible exports. This is in effect a classic example of the difficulties in regulating the 
exports of dual-use items.I  However, this group of technologies and products is even more 
complex as they do not necessarily fit the definition of dual-use, as they can be used for human 
rights abuses and internal repression without there being any involvement of military forces. 
Finally, as Edler and James (2012) point out the Commission has deliberately kept the concept of 
security research, firms and technologies ambiguous for their own purposes. This ambiguity makes 
it difficult to define the sort of boundaries needed for security technologies to be added to the list-
based systems of export controls that exist for military and dual-use goods. 
It has already been pointed out that security technologies and products are partially covered by 
three separate EU regimes, namely the Common Position on arms exports, the dual-use regulation 
and the torture regulation, and additionally national controls. All three appeared to be under 
review at the time of writing. The report will assess each of these regimes, outline which security 
technologies are covered and what the strengths and weaknesses are, and discuss the potential 
reforms proposed. It will also look at the effectiveness of sanctions and embargos and of industry-
led voluntary codes. Finally, it will assess the strength of claims that rather than controlling them, 
there is a need to enable such exports, looking in particular at the external aspects of the EU’s 
Internal Security Strategy.II Firstly though, the next sub-section of this debate will outline how the 
European and latterly EU position on the control of strategic goods has evolved, the different ways 
in which the debate can be framed, and point to emerging trends, which may have an impact on 
the discussion about the control of security technologies. 
5.2 The Control of Strategic Goods: Framing the 
Debate 
While the synergies between defence and security technologies, firms and products can be 
overstated (IRIS et al, 2010), the similarities are such that it is understandable that policy-makers 
wishing to restrict exports of security technologies have turned to the framework governing 
defence exports and in particular the dual-use legislation. It is perhaps worthwhile at this point to 
consider the potential rationales for arms export control and see how they apply to security 
technologies and products. Governments have deemed it desirable to restrict exports of arms for 
the following reasons: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Although Wagner (2012a: 7) points out that that “typical censorship and surveillance technologies are sold as systems and are 
not typically used for multiple overlapping purposes. Although the base hardware is theoretically capable of performing 
multiple diverse tasks, the systems themselves are typically built and maintained for one specific purpose: limiting individual 
human rights.” 
II  The US Committee on Homeland Security and Export Controls (2012) for example argues that US export controls on homeland 
security technologies are preventing the DHS from engaging in international cooperation. 
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1. Non-proliferation of certain types of technology – here we think particularly of controls on 
the exports of technologies enabling nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, but 
also certain types of missile technology. The proliferation of such technologies is deemed 
to endanger global security and stability. 
2. Maintenance of strategic superiority – countries may decide to forbid the export of 
technologies that allow them to maintain a strategic edge over their competitors. 
3. Maintenance of control over ‘their’ defence firms – concerns about security of supply may 
lead states to prevent key defence firms from building up substantial business in other 
states to ensure that they retain power over that firm and thus defence supplies.   
4. Prevention of human rights abuses or escalating conflict situations – states may have 
ethical reasons to forbid arms exports e.g. they have reason to believe the recipient state 
would use the equipment to perpetuate human rights abuse. Equally they may decide that 
arms exports would escalate a regional conflict. 
Realistically, the only argument that is likely to really apply to security products is human rights 
concerns. On the other hand governments may decide arms exports are desirable for the following 
reasons:  
− Pursuit or maintenance of influence – governments may permit arms exports to regions or 
states where they wish to increase or maintain their strategic influence on the recipient state. 
− Wealth – arms exports are usually considered to be profitable for the exporting state (although 
export subsidies make this assertion questionable). 
− Maintenance of indigenous weapons programmes – substantial exports increase the 
affordability of indigenous weapons programmes through economies of scale. 
These arguments in favour are all made implicitly or explicitly with respect to the export of security 
products by the Commission in their security industrial policy communiqué (European Commission, 
2012a), suggesting that convincing the EU of the necessity of export controls on security 
technology will be difficult.  
Equally, it is necessary to ask whether arms export controls are effective and whether they could 
be easily applied to security technologies. Cooper (2006) points out there is already a substantial 
difference in effectiveness between arms control regimes aimed preventing the proliferation of key 
technologies (especially NBC technologies) and controls on conventional arms, which he suggests 
are largely tokenistic. The former are largely successful because of three factors. Cooper (2006: 
119) argues that firstly there are “relatively high technological barriers to entry” coupled with 
“scarce availability of key materials”, secondly, that the disciplinary mechanisms in the regimes are 
both severe and enforced, and thirdly, that the regimes are underpinned by a “powerful (and 
almost universal) norm against NBC proliferation”. Conventional arms export control regimes in 
contrast frequently suffer from a lack of political will to overcome strategic and commercial 
interests. Moreover, the increasingly global nature of the defence industry undermines national 
controls. Finally, the growing importance of dual-use technologies in defence equipment and 
pervasive “globalised illicit arms networks” have eroded the strength of existing conventional 
weapons transfer controls as proliferation is significantly harder to prevent (Cooper, 2006: 118). 
Certainly the EU Common Position on conventional arms exports has been criticised for failing to 
prevent exports to problematic recipients (Poitevin, 2011). The dual-use export controls are also 
viewed as inadequate where conventional weapons are concerned as attention has concentrated 
on stopping nuclear proliferation. 
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What does this tell us about the likely effectiveness of a regime aimed at controlling the export of 
security technologies?  Let us first examine the factors that underpin the success of the NBC 
regimes. Are there high technological barriers to entry or reliance on hard to obtain materials? In 
the case of security (and much conventional military) equipment the answer is increasingly no. 
Neither is expertise confined to the EU and allied states. This immediately limits the ability of the 
EU to limit the proliferation of security equipment, particularly where complex systems integration 
has not been involved. Secondly, as with conventional arms exports, the international penalties for 
states failing to enforce dual-use legislation and sanctions are not particularly severe (Cooper, 
2006). Thirdly, there is no universal or powerful norm against the export of security equipment; 
indeed the global logic of the ‘War on Terror’ would suggest that such exports would be desirable. 
Finally, we have to consider how the debate on the control of strategic goods is being framed at 
present. Cornish (1995) points out that the rationales for enabling or preventing weapons sales 
within Europe have not been consistent, but rather reflected the status of international relations at 
the time. While during the Cold War arms exports from Western Europe were often tied to ideals 
of furthering Western ideas and influence and preventing sales to those who did not share these 
aims, at the end of the Cold War political restrictions vanished, and there briefly a near free market 
in arms emerged (Cornish, 1995). Economic rather than balance of power considerations became 
important. It could also be argued in the 1990s that political and NGO attention turned away from 
the task of general controls on conventional weapons, and towards ensuring non-proliferation of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and to stopping the trade in what became known as 
‘pariah’ weapons such as cluster bombs and landmines. Following a series of scandals in the 1990s 
though, political will in the EU emerged to agree a system of arms export controls, that would take 
into account the recipient state’s human rights record. As Bailes (2004) has argued, the Code of 
Conduct started a virtuous circle of pressures to improve consistency and transparency between 
EU member states through annual reporting and mutual pressure. Rather than a race to the 
bottom, it seemed that a new era of responsibility was emerging.I When in 2008 the French 
dropped their long-standing opposition (in return for the acceptance of the directive on intra-
community transfers (ICT) of defence products), and the Code of Conduct became a legally binding 
Common Position, the EU broke new ground. However, as Poitevin (2011) and Depauw (2010) 
point out, the Common Position has been rather disappointing in the way it has been implemented 
thus far. There has been delayed and substandard reporting from member states, the Position is 
inconsistently implemented (especially problematic given the ICT directive), and arms export 
scandals are still occurring. Moreover, there are signs that one important state, Germany, is 
seeking to loosen arms export controls through NATO. The German media has reported that 
Germany presented a paper to the 2012 Chicago summit calling for agreement on a list of 
strategically important states for the NATO partners, to whom arms sales would be permitted even 
if their human rights records were weak (Steinmann and Dierks, 2012). The Financial Times 
Deutschland names the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council as among those proposed. While 
the initiative was apparently coolly received by other NATO states, this marks both a substantial 
shift in Germany’s own restrictive approach to arms export controls, but also a potentially 
problematic step for NGOs pushing for improvements in the EU Common Position. 
These shifts in attitudes on conventional arms export also play into the framing of the initial debate 
on the control of security technologies. Early discussions, notably in the European Parliament about 
the updating of the dual-use regime in 2011,II together with the media reports from the Arab 
Spring, focussed attention on surveillance and detection technologies. They revealed both a lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Although France, Germany and the UK continued to feature regularly in the top five of annual lists of arms exporting states. 
II  These will be discussed fully in the sub-section on dual-use. 
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political will in some quarters. Although there is some support, notably in the Netherlands (the 
Dutch Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal supported export controls on technologies that filter Internet 
content for example) and to some extent in the UK, the German government lobbied heavily 
against the inclusion of stricter measures on telecommunications technologies in the revised dual-
use legislation. In 2010 the then German Economics minister, Rainer Brüderle, declared the civilian 
security area to be a future market for German industry and warned against burdening industry 
with legal impediments.I Despite the growing evidence of misuse of EU and German exports of 
surveillance technologies to repressive regimes,II his successor Rösler is determined to maintain 
this position (Schumann, 2011). Similarly, Sweden softened sanctions against Syria in 2011 by 
blocking the inclusion of two Syrian telecommunications firms with commercial links to Swedish 
firm Ericsson on the sanctions list (Brunnstrom and Ringstrom, 2011). The discussion on security 
technologies is also being played out against a backdrop of Commission attempts to liberalise dual-
use controls, which will be discussed in the sub-section on dual-use controls.  
The case for the EU acting as a normative or virtuous international actor, which therefore restricts 
exports of security technologies on human rights grounds, is less clear-cut than it has been in the 
past on conventional arms exports, allowing policy space for different conceptions such as the EU 
as a trading power or security provider to emerge. The concentration on surveillance technologies 
has meant that the debate has been orchestrated by internet freedom NGOs (and human rights 
NGOs) rather than those who have specialised in the arms trade (possibly because their energies 
were devoted to the UN Arms Trade Treaty negotiations). The continuing economic troubles 
affecting most EU member states also do not favour agreement on controls. Moreover, there is 
also a precedent for disagreement in that the EU has failed in the past to agree a list of security and 
police equipment for control. Neither, if we recall table 1, can it be realistically argued that all 
security technologies should be controlled for export purposes. All states need to invest in critical 
infrastructure protection and given global interdependence, it is desirable, for example, that all 
states have adequate passenger and baggage screening equipment at airports. Global 
interdependence means that homeland security requires international cooperation and where 
necessary technology sharing (Committee on Homeland Security and Export Controls, 2012). Export 
controls can also have other unintended human rights impacts: expanding the definition of dual-
use goods to include all potentially problematic cases can lead to humanitarian crises, as US abuse 
of the concept during the UN sanctions on Iraq between 1990 and 2003 showed (Gordon, 2010). It 
seems therefore more fruitful in the rest of this section, rather than proposing the control of all 
security technologies, instead to consider the way in which existing and potential control regimes 
could be amended or improved to close loopholes in this area, or to extend coverage to the most 
problematic technologies. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The German position is significant as the German export control office (BAFA) is mandated by the EU to carry out projects 
aimed at enhancing international cooperation on dual-use controls. An overview of their activities can be found here: 
http://www.eu-outreach.info/eu_outreach/ 
II  See ’Security made in Germany’ for details of the more controversial German exports: http://www.german-foreign-
policy.com/en/fulltext/57919?PHPSESSID=snktg8f7sg5f55goenjjb9lol4 
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5.3 Existing and Potential Control Regimes 
The initial debate about controlling the exports on some types of security equipment has focussed 
on the EU dual-use regime.  This is probably the most likely type of regime to be used in these 
circumstances and some progress has been made in the 2011 update process. Moreover, there is 
an ongoing consultation and review process of the regime. However, as has already been argued 
the classification of these technologies and products as dual-use is problematic under the current 
legislation and it may be that other types of regulatory framework are more appropriate. Similarly, 
it is already clear that there is some opposition to using the dual-use regime as a regulatory 
framework. While this sub-section looks in depth at the position with the dual-use regime, it also 
considers the relevance of the Common Position on arms exports, the Torture regulation, sanctions 
and embargos and industry-led self-regulatory frameworks. 
5.3.1   EU Dual-Use Regulation 
Technologies and goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes are described as 
dual-use. The EU has agreed a dual-use export regime to control the export, transfer, transit and 
brokering of such items (Council Regulation 428/2009 which was amended in 2010, 2011 and 
2012). Under the regime controlled items may not leave EU territory without a licence. With the 
exception of those items listed in annex 4, dual-use items can be traded freely within the EU. There 
are four types of export authorisation: community general export authorisations, national general 
export authorisations, global authorisations and individual licences. The EU list of controlled items 
is derived from the control lists adopted by the international export control regimes to prevent the 
proliferation of certain types of weapon – namely the Australia Group (biological and chemical 
weapons), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (nuclear weapons), the Wassenaar Arrangement 
(conventional weapons) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (unmanned delivery systems 
capable of delivering WMD). There are two aspects of the regime worthy of analysis; the listing 
system and the EU implementation procedures. As the EU lists represent a consolidated list, it is 
important to consider how the decisions on inclusion and deletion are taken. The sub-section will 
then look at the implementation system and efforts to reform it to counter some of the problems 
than emerged with exports to MENA. 
While some types of unmanned aerial vehicles (and associated technologies) and some sensor 
technologies are covered by the MTCR, the most important regime for the purposes of this report 
is the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement is often neglected in accounts of the 
dual-use regime, as the political priority for some time has been the prevention of WMD not 
conventional weapons proliferation (Wetter, 2009) The criteria for the selection (or deletion) of 
goods for the Wassenaar lists are: 
“Dual-use goods and technologies to be controlled are those which are major or key elements for 
the indigenous development, production, use or enhancement of military capabilities. For selection 
purposes the dual-use items should also be evaluated against the following criteria: 
− Foreign availability outside Participating States. 
− The ability to control effectively the export of the goods. 
− The ability to make a clear and objective specification of the item 
− Controlled by another regime.” (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2005) 
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Immediately, the problems raised earlier about the control of security technologies as a group 
become clear. The concept is ambiguous, the technologies based largely on globally available 
generic technologies and they may not contribute to military capabilities. Evans (2008) argues that 
Wassenaar listing decisions are marked by a tension between those who view dual-use 
technologies as a problem of control and those who see them as a new market to exploit rather 
than control. Participating states agree to maintain export controls on all listed items but they 
make the decision whether to issue a licence or not. Information sharing modalities are also used 
to increase transparency. The Wassenaar dual-use lists are divided into the following categories:I 
  Category 1  Special Materials and Related Equipment 
  Category 2  Materials Processing 
  Category 3  Electronics 
  Category 4  Computers 
  Category 5 - Part 1  Telecommunications 
Category 5 - Part 2  "Information Security" 
  Category 6  Sensors and “Lasers” 
  Category 7  Navigation and Avionics 
  Category 8  Marine 
Category 9  Aerospace and Propulsion 
 
Obviously, only a small percentage of the items that could be covered by these categories are 
controlled – most would fail to meet the criteria for listing. Nevertheless, some of the security 
technologies that were listed by ESRAB, such as hyperspectral and multispectral sensors, some 
encryption technologies and much of the technology and materials involved in the production of 
larger UAVs are included. Wagner (2012b) argues that EU cooperation with the Wassenaar partners 
could get more technologies included. This is probably possibly the case despite the listing criteria 
working against such inclusions. Moreover, national controls on additional technologies further to 
the EU lists are permitted.II  
Attempts within the EU to strengthen the implementation of the dual-use regime have centred on 
the European Parliament. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, updates to the dual-use lists, 
Community General Export Authorisations and any review of the regulation are subject to the co-
decision procedure. In 2011 following reports of the misuse of surveillance and detection 
technologies in the Arab Spring, some MEPsIII tried to use the update to the regulation to insert 
text into the Commission’s legislative proposal strengthening the controls over these technologies. 
Jörg Leichtfried, the rapporteur for the International Trade committee on the Commission 2010 
proposals to amend the dual-use legislation, proposed a number of amendments some to the text 
and some to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the dual-use regime,IV one of which was 
particularly important as far as surveillance technologies are concerned, and was accepted by the 
Council.  The EU General Export Authorisation for telecommunications was amended to read that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The Wassenaar Agreement also includes the munitions list which is the equivalent of the EU Common Military List, and two 
annexes - the sensitive and very sensitive lists. These annexes represent nested sub-sections of the main categories and 
include technologies that it is agreed are critical and where greater levels of information sharing on licensing decisions are 
required, and in the case of the very sensitive list participating states agree to exercise extreme vigilance. 
II  Article 8 of Council Regulation 428/2009 allows member states to unilaterally impose restrictions on unlisted items on the 
human rights or public security grounds. France, Germany, Latvia and the UK have taken advantage of this measure. Details 
are available in the Official Journal of 6 March 2012. 
III  Some of the most active were Dutch MEPs Marietje Schaake and Lambert van Nistelrooij, Jörg Leichtfried from Austria and 
Vital Moreira from Portugal. 
IV  A proposed general export authorisation for computers was also deleted. The full list of amendments can be viewed at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0028&language=EN 
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the export was not authorised if the exporter was aware that the equipment could be used for (or 
had been warned that this was the case by the member state): 
“for use in connection with a violation of human rights, democratic principles or freedom of speech 
as defined by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by using interception 
technologies and digital data transfer devices for monitoring mobile phones and text messages and 
targeted surveillance of Internet use (e.g. via Monitoring Centres and Lawful Interception 
Gateways);” (Regulation 1232/2011 Annex IIe Part 3 1(1)(d)) 
While the destinations that the general export authorisation applies to do not include any of the 
Arab Spring countries, it does include countries like Russia and China, who are known to engage in 
such practices. It also sets a useful precedent for further changes. Leichtfried claims to have been 
surprised at the extent of the hostility towards some of his other amendments.I 
In June 2011 the Commission issued a Green Paper on the reform of the dual-use regime and 
launched a consultation.  The thrust of the Green Paper is towards greater harmonisation and for 
general export authorisations to be at the EU not the national level. It is argued that firms whose 
states preserve stricter understandings of catch-all clauses are disadvantaged. Broadly speaking the 
Commission approach is towards greater liberalisation rather than restriction.  Greater 
harmonisation has been opposed by both the UK and Germany in their submissions as 
unnecessary. According to the Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung (GKKE) group 
(2012), which contributes an annual report on German arms export policy, the only measure that 
the German government supported with enthusiasm in the Green Paper was speeding up the 
updating procedure for the regulation, which would diminish the ability of the European 
Parliament to amend the legislation. The Netherlands is also sceptical about the need for major 
change and the extension of EU general export authorisations, but would favour the introduction 
of an EU level catch-all clause to harmonise implementation (Bleker, 2011). 
The consultation has seen a number of proposals that may help tighten export controls of security 
technologies if accepted. The UK has proposed in its submission that the definition of military end-
use in Article 4(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 be amended to read “intended for military, 
paramilitary, security or police forces in a destination subject to an arms embargo or to an entity 
involved in procurement, manufacture, maintenance, repair or operation on their behalf.” Their 
justification is that the current control is too narrow. Their legal advice suggests that under the 
current wording they cannot prevent the export of complete items which are to be used as 
complete items. “For example, we could prevent the export of an unlisted item intended to be used 
as a component in a military vehicle but we could not prevent the export of a complete civilian 
vehicle that was to be used by the military or internal security forces of the destination country even 
where that country is subject to arms embargo. It is also unclear whether the military end-use 
control permits us to prevent the export of an unlisted item that is to be modified for military 
purposes, either in the destination country or in an intermediate destination” (House of Commons, 
2012). Such an amendment would extend the understanding of military end-use to include internal 
security forces, which could be helpful. Vranckx, Slijper and Isbister (2011) make a similar 
suggestion arguing that an unlisted item that was to be converted for military or security use 
should be covered if either the state or the firm knew about it. This is however a complex problem 
as one recent case shows. Engines made by German firm 3W Modellmotoren appear to have been 
resold by dealers, without the firm’s knowledge, to Belarus where they are being used to power 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  Leichtfried’s comments in 2012 can be viewed here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20120208-1630-COMMITTEE-AFET  
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spy drones, despite an EU embargo from 2011 preventing the sale of technologies that could be 
used for internal repression (Nielsen, 2012b). Bromley (2012) has recommended new controls on 
exports of surveillance technologies within either the dual-use regime or common position reviews. 
All of these suggestions would potentially enable action to be taken on the exports of some types 
of security technologies, but these suggestions are only suggestions and run contrary in some cases 
to the Commission proposals. 
5.3.2   Common Position on Arms Exports 
Since 2008, the EU has had a Common Position outlining the rules on the control of exports of 
military technology and equipment across the EU. This is the successor to the Code of Conduct on 
arms exports agreed in 1998. The harmonisation of arms exports controls during the last fifteen 
years has not just been about establishing minimum standards throughout the EU but also about 
greater information exchange and transparency between member states. In comparison to the 
Code of Conduct the Common Position is legally binding.  Goods named in the EU Common Military 
ListI require licenses if they are to be exported. Decisions on licensing must consider the eight 
criteria detailed in table 5.1.II 
Table 6 Common Position Criteria 
Criterion Description 
1 Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the 
sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the 
Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other 
international obligations  
2 Respect of human rights in the country of final destination  
3 Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence 
of tensions or armed conflicts. 
4 Preservation of regional peace, security and stability 
5 National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations 
are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied 
countries 
6 Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as 
regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and 
respect for international law. 
7 Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted 
within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. 
8 Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the 
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the 
desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs 
with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments 
Source: Cooper (2012: 11) 
Member states must consider any denials of licenses for the same equipment within the last three 
years, and must provide an annual report on their licensing decisions. The Common Position is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The Common Military list can be found at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:069:0019:0051:EN:PDF  
II  Article 12 of Regulation 428/2009 (dual-use regime) states that licensing decisions on dual-use exports must also respect 
these criteria. 
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considered an advance on the Code of Conduct because in addition to being legally binding, it also 
includes measures on brokering, transit transactions and intangible technology transfers. While the 
Common Position applies to military not security technologies (unless listed as dual-use) it is 
interesting for several reasons. 
Firstly, there is Article 6, which makes it clear that exports to internal security forces and similar 
entities are covered as well as the military: 
“Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000, the criteria in Article 2 of this Common 
Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 are also to apply to Member States 
in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 
where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will 
be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country. References 
in this Common Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such 
goods and technology.” (Council of the European Union, 2008c) 
Secondly, a small number of technologies listed in table 1 as security technologies figure in the 
common military list, with the caveat that they are only covered if specifically designed or modified 
for military use. The most obvious examples are unmanned aerial vehicles and some types of CBRN 
equipment. If the Commission (2012a) pushes forward its plans for hybrid military and security 
standards for some types of products as suggested in its security industrial policy communiqué, 
presumably products intended for civilian users would also be covered. Similarly, the joint research 
work between the EDA and Commission under Framework Cooperation could have similar results. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most straightforwardly, it does not preclude member states from adopting 
stricter national controls. The UK, for example, has added some items of equipment that it 
describes as security, paramilitary and police goods to its national military list.I This is an avenue 
that concerned member states could follow if there is no consensus at the EU level. 
The Common Position is also undergoing a review process as foreseen in the initial decision. While 
this need not necessarily entail revisions, Bromley (2012) states that a number of items have been 
placed on the agenda as a result of EU states aligning their positions on the proposed UN Arms 
Trade Treaty, including enhanced consultation mechanisms for problematic destinations; how data 
for the EU annual report should be submitted; the national implementation of controls on transit, 
transhipment and brokering at the national level; how COARM functions; what information should 
be shared on license denials and the use of global and general licences. Many of the NGO proposals 
for reform share these concerns, centring in particular on the need for more uniform 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  The UK has added the following goods to its military list for example: “Other security and para-military police goods as 
follows:  
a. Acoustic devices represented by the manufacturers or suppliers thereof as suitable for riot control purposes, and specially 
designed components therefor;  
b. Anti-riot and ballistic shields and specially designed components therefor;  
c. Shackles designed for restraining human beings having an overall dimension including chain, when measured from the 
outer edge of one cuff to the outer edge of the other cuff, of between 240mm and 280mm when locked;  
d. Electric–shock belts designed for restraining human beings by the administration of electric shocks having a no-load voltage 
not exceeding 10 000 volts;  
e. Water cannon and specially designed components therefor;  
f. Riot control vehicles which have been specially designed or modified to be electrified to repel boarders and components 
therefor specially designed or modified for that purpose;  
g. Electric-shock dart guns having a no-load voltage not exceeding 10,000 volts;  
h. Components specially designed or modified for portable devices designed or modified for the purposes of riot control or 
self-protection by the administration of an electric shock (e.g., electric-shock batons, electric-shock shields, stun-guns and 
electric-shock dart-guns).” (BIS, 2012) 
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implementation and greater transparency about licensing approvals and denials. Depauw (2010) 
for example points out that with the introduction of the ICT directive, it is unclear how states will 
be able to prevent re-exports of military equipment initially sold to other member states if they 
disapprove of the re-export. If all states are not using the criteria in the same manner then 
problems of undercutting are likely to arise. Analysts have also been keen to draw lessons from the 
questions raised during the Arab Spring about the robustness of EU arms export procedures, 
proposing that a new criterion could be added to explicitly consider poor governance as a risk 
factor, that a list of countries of concern could be agreed and that special arrangements could be 
made after the lifting of an embargo (Vranckx, Slijper and Isbister, 2011; Bromley, 2012). While 
these may not cover security technologies, there are connections between the regimes, and 
changes in one setting may prove helpful precedents in other debates. 
The EU also could lobby for some technologies to be added to the Wassenaar lists. Where 
surveillance technologies of the type used in the Arab Spring are concerned Munitions List 11a (c) 
“Electronic systems or equipment, designed either for surveillance and monitoring of the electro-
magnetic spectrum for military intelligence or security purposes or for counteracting such 
surveillance and monitoring;” would seem to be potentially useful as a starting point for discussion. 
Within the EU context given the concerns of the Commission and some member states about 
regulation in this context disadvantaging EU firms, attempts to add some technologies to the 
Wassenaar regime might be more acceptable. 
5.3.3   The EU Torture Regulation 
As had already been mentioned, initial plans to include a security and police equipment list in the 
Code of Conduct on arms exports failed. There was however agreement to accept a Commission 
proposal to regulate the exports of items that could be used for torture of other cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment. This was in line with guidelines on policy towards third countries 
committing acts of torture agreed in 2001. These guidelines did not create legal obligations but 
rather expressed a political commitment on the part of the EU to the global campaign against 
torture. While early reviews (Council of the EU, 2008a) suggested that the effect of the guidelines 
had not been as comprehensive as hoped, one result was the adoption of EC Regulation 
1236/2005, generally known as the Torture Regulation. The regulation banned trade in some goods 
used to restrain or execute humans, and introduced controls on the export of other items which 
could be used for torture. While the lists in both cases are short, it remains a good example of a 
decision to restrict exports of certain security-related products even though there is no military 
connection and thus is of interest to this report. The regulation’s scope is outlined below and then 
the strengths and weaknesses are discussed.  
The regulation, revised in 2011, prohibits the import and export of the following items listed in 
Annex 2: 
1. Goods designed for the execution of human beings, as follows:  
1.1. Gallows and guillotines  
1.2. Electric chairs for the purpose of execution of human beings  
1.3. Air-tight vaults, made of e.g. steel and glass, designed for the purpose of execution of 
human beings by the administration of a lethal gas or substance  
1.4. Automatic drug injection systems designed for the purpose of execution of human 
beings by the administration of a lethal chemical substance  
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2. Goods designed for restraining human beings, as follows:  
2.1. Electric-shock devices which are intended to be worn on the body by a restrained 
individual, such as belts, sleeves and cuffs, designed for restraining human beings by the 
administration of electric shocks having a no-load voltage exceeding 10 000 V  
3. Portable devices allegedly designed for the purpose of riot control, as follows:  
3.1. Batons or truncheons made of metal or other material having a shaft with metal spikes 
The rationale for banning these products from export is that they cannot be used for any purpose 
other than torture or inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment. NGOs successfully argued for the 
2011 addition of spiked batons and truncheons on this basis (Amnesty International and Omega 
Foundation, 2010). Annex 3 contains a list of specific products under the following headings: 
− Goods designed for restraining human beings 
− Portable devices designed for the purpose of riot control or self-protection 
− Portable equipment for dissemination of incapacitating substances for the purpose of riot 
control or self-protection and related substances 
− Products which could be used for the execution of human beings by means of lethal injection. 
These products must be licensed on a case-by-case assessment basis for export and licensing 
authorities should consider the likelihood of misuse by the recipient state. Member states should 
also take into account any refusal of a license by other member states in the preceding three years 
in making their decision. This information is not made public by most member states, but from a 
sample of six states that did, Amnesty International and Omega (2010) point out that between 
2006 and 2008 both the Czech Republic and Germany have supplied security-related equipment 
that could be used for torture to countries that are known to commit human rights abuses. 
There are known problems with the regulation. Alongside the lack of transparency, the regulation 
suffers from the problems of all list-based controls. As an NGO report points out;  
“List-based systems provide clarity for exporters and importers, but on their own can have inherent 
weaknesses, including: 
- Not controlling a range of products even though they fall within the intended scope of the 
agreement, because they are not specifically named on the control lists; 
- The delay often experienced between the manufacture, transfer and use of newly designed 
equipment, and the time taken for it to be added to a control list; 
- The potential for suppliers to evade controls simply by re-naming or re-specifying their 
products.” (Amnesty International and Omega Foundation, 2010: 28) 
Since 2008, the UK has been a supporter of the introduction of a torture end-use catch-all clause at 
the EU level, which would allow a member state to license and thus ban any item that could be 
used for torture. Correspondence between the UK government and Baroness Ashton from 2011, 
published by the UK House of Commons Committees on Arms Exports Controls in 2012, suggests a 
review of the scope of the legislation is taking place (House of Commons, 2012 – written evidence 
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142). However, there is growing NGO and parliamentary pressure, particularly in the UK, for 
supportive states to introduce such measures unilaterally, in the belief that there is not sufficient 
support for the measure across the EU.I While not unproblematic, the Torture Regulation 
nevertheless does offer a precedent in the restriction of non-military security-related goods at the 
EU level, and could serve as a model for banning what Wagner (2012b) describes as the worst of 
the worst technologies: single use technologies whose only purpose is repression. 
5.3.4   Sanctions and Embargos 
Since late 2011 the EU has increasingly included specific clauses in its sanctions and embargos to 
cover surveillance technologies. In December 2011, the Council of the European Union passed 
additional sanctions, to ban “equipment and software intended for use in the monitoring of the 
Internet and telephone communications” (17985/11) from entering Syria. Moreover on 23 March 
2012, in response to the use of the technologies in acts of repression, the EU broadened sanctions 
on Iran by adopting Council Regulation 264/2012, which prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or 
export to Iran of equipment and technology that could be used for monitoring and interception of 
internet and telephone communications. This includes the provision of technical assistance. The US 
White House went a step further in April 2012 by announcing targeted financial sanctions against 
firms selling surveillance technologies to Iran and Syria.II These moves have almost certainly come 
in response to sustained media and parliamentary pressure on the issue. 
Do sanctions offer a satisfactory answer to this problem? Wagner (2012b) suggests that they are 
best seen as a short-term solution to stopping the worst types of surveillance technologies reaching 
regimes actively engaged in internal repression. It is generally faster to agree a sanction than it is to 
amend a multilateral export control regime. However, the grey areas between acceptable and 
unacceptable technologies make such sanctions permeable and difficult to police. Another 
potential issue is that crackdowns of this nature often appear dependent on the vigour of the 
media, politicians and NGOs in exposing abuses. The disadvantage here is that this means 
disproportionate attention can be paid to some abuses deemed newsworthy, while others, equally 
as severe, go unnoticed. Had the Arab Spring and Iranian protests not been framed as being about 
the use of social media to organise protest, would surveillance technology exports have gained 
such attention? This may also mean that only certain countries are targeted leading to problems of 
inconsistency. For example, Reporters without Borders (2012) named Vietnam (along with Syria 
and Iran) as one of the twelve countries deemed to be enemies of the internet, but in June 2012 
the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Vietnam marking an upgrade in the 
relationship. Country-specific rather than general bans also mean that it is difficult to prevent re-
exports from third countries. 
5.3.5   Industry-led Voluntary Codes  
Despite much negative publicity about firms exporting arms to inappropriate recipient states, the 
firms involved appear to take the view that so long as their trade is legal and government-
supported, then public reputational damage through association with human rights abuse is less 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  In response to NGO and media pressure the UK has introduced unilateral controls in 2011 on the supply of drugs to the US 
that could be used to carry out the death penalty, and previously on sting sticks and electro shock devices (House of 
Commons, 2012). 
II  The White House Executive Order of 23 April 2012 can be viewed at: 
http://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/USTREAS/2012/04/23/file_attachments/108232/2012iransyria.eo.rel.pdf 
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important. After all their business is with governments not the general public. Reputational damage 
for firms that do rely on their brand perception to support non-governmental sales is much more 
serious. For example, allegations in July 2011 that British newspaper ‘News of the World’ had 
illicitly accessed the mobile phone voice messages of a murdered schoolgirl led to a highly 
successful social media campaign to force other firms to withdraw advertising from the paper. 
Israel (2009) suggests that ICT companies are particularly vulnerable to reputational damage 
because their most valuable assets are their brand and human capital. Given this, and an industry 
preference for avoiding government intervention, it is unsurprising that various government-
backed stakeholder initiatives on ICT and human rights have emerged in a similar vein to the 
Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds. They also form a response to the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights which were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. 
Perhaps the most visible of these efforts is the Global Network Initiative (GNI). This was launched in 
2008 after two years of collaboration between three leading ICT companies (Microsoft, Yahoo and 
Google), human rights investigators, academics and investors to agree an approach. It represented 
a response to criticism of ICT firms for restricting internet freedom especially in China and to what 
at the time looked like potential legislation in the US Congress (Israel, 2009). Membership commits 
a firm to the GNI principles and to independent assessment of its compliance. However, GNI has 
met with criticism from Amnesty International, which was involved in the talks but did not join 
claiming the regime was too weak, and from business commentators who point to the fact that no 
other major ICT firms have joined claiming the regulatory burden is too onerous (Downes, 2011).  A 
group of predominantly European telecommunications companies are also engaging in an Industry 
Dialogue on issues of privacy and free expression. Finally, in response to the issues raised about ICT 
and repression during the Arab Spring the European Commission is developing a ‘No Disconnect’ 
strategy based on the following four aims: 
1. “Developing and providing technological tools to enhance privacy and security of people 
living in non-democratic regimes when using ICT.  
2. Educating and raising awareness of activists about the opportunities and risks of ICT. In 
particular assisting activists to make best use of tools such as social networks and blogs 
while raising awareness of surveillance risks when communicating via ICT. 
3. Gathering high quality intelligence about what is happening "on the ground" in order to 
monitor the level of surveillance and censorship at a given time, in a given place.  
4. Cooperation. Developing a practical way to ensure that all stakeholders can share 
information on their activity and promote multilateral action and building cross-regional 
cooperation to protect human rights.” (EU press release, 2011) 
Wagner (2012b) points to the Institute for Human Rights and Business which is developing self-
regulatory stakeholder guidance on the respect of human rights for the ICT sector on behalf of the 
Commission as an example of the work behind this approach. 
While corporate social responsibility is to be encouraged, and guidance for firms exporting all 
manner of security technologies (not just ICT) on human rights issues is to be encouraged, given 
the current unclear legal situation on export controls, these initiatives are unlikely to be sufficient. 
Wagner (2012b) argues that they should be seen as helpful steps in conjunction with legislative 
action. Reputational damage is recoverable, and there are ways to minimise it such as the use of 
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subsidiary companies to do business that may prove problematic. Without the fear of legal 
consequences, and greater transparency around exports, scandals are likely to reoccur. 
5.4 Is Control Needed?: The External Aspects of 
the EU Internal Security Strategy 
The 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy states that:  
“A concept of internal security cannot exist without an external dimension, since internal security 
increasingly depends to a large extent on external security. International cooperation by the EU and 
its Member States, both bilaterally and multilaterally, is essential in order to guarantee security and 
protect the rights of our citizens and to promote security and respect for rights abroad.”(Council of 
the European Union, 2010: 16). 
This statement implicitly recognises the interdependence of contemporary global security. If 
international passenger flights are to be made secure for example, it is clear that the more sensible 
option is, rather than banning flights from any country deemed a terrorism concern, instead to 
ensure that the country can acquire advanced passenger and freight screening technology. The 
same logic applies for much counter-terrorism, migration and international crime cooperation with 
third countries – technology will need to be shared if the EU is to meet its policy objectives. 
However, while the Internal Security Strategy’s goals and indeed those of the Stockholm 
Programme are dependent on agreements with third countries, as Monar argues, “The negotiation 
of such agreements can be difficult because third countries often do not meet EU standards in terms 
of respect of fundamental rights, judicial procedures and data protection.” (Monar, 2010: 32) 
This tension is at the crux of the difficulties that the EU faces regarding the export of security 
technologies. It is further intensified by the EU’s neighbourhood policies, which have put emphasis 
on stability in the EU neighbourhood at the expense of democracy promotion (Youngs, 2002) 
meaning that the EU has had to and will have to deal regularly with problematic actors, where 
human rights are concerned. Finally, in line with the EU’s general stance on free trade, insofar as 
the EU and its member states can be said to have a common policy towards the security industry, it 
has been assumed that export potential would be strong (Schumann, 2011; European Commission 
2012a). 
Let us unpack the nature of these dilemmas by drawing on an example. Counter-terrorism 
cooperation with third countries, whose human rights records are problematic, is always a difficult 
balancing act between the desire for security and the desire to promote human rights.  For 
example, the EU-Egypt Action Plan from 2010 stated that the EU and Egypt would cooperate on 
fighting “the use of the internet for terrorist purposes” and that the EU would support capacity 
building in the “technological capabilities of law enforcement institutions” (European Commission, 
2010: 31). But this inevitably means internet filtering and blocking and it was widely known that 
Egypt suppressed freedom of expression through surveillance across communications mediums 
(Wagner, 2012b). It is not clear in this case that EU human rights and counter-terrorism aims are 
compatible.   
The European Commission (2012b) has also defined cybercrime as a major security issue. 
Recognising it as the ultimate borderless crime, the need for international partners is clear. 
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Commission proposals over the last decade to improve the policing of terrorist radicalisation on the 
internet or to prevent the sharing of internet child pornography are often dependent on internet 
filtering or forcing internet providers to share the browsing history of their subscribers. These 
technologies are available and in use in the EU itself.I If cybercrime is to be successfully countered, 
then third countries would need to be enabled to access such technology. This would seem to 
legitimate the export of such security technology, but it is precisely the usage of these systems to 
track activists during the Arab Spring that has proved so controversial (Valentino-Devries et al, 
2011).  
Another example is border management. The EU’s own proposed border management plan, 
EUROSUR and the Smart Borders initiative, involves mass use of surveillance technologies including 
the use of UAVs for monitoring the Mediterranean. A driving aim behind the initiatives is a 
response to the border ‘crisis’ caused by the Arab Spring, when many people sought refuge from 
the fighting in the EU. The aim is not just to track migration and visa abuses much more strictly but 
also to create buffer zones for the policing of migrants outside EU territory. It is therefore 
dependent on the cooperation of third countries and the sharing of personal data about migrants 
and the technology to monitor migration with them. In an extremely critical report on the 
proposals for EUROSUR and Smart Borders, Hayes and Vermeulen (2012) allege that the plans 
contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as EU cooperation agreements with third 
states amount to a ban on unauthorised departure and thus a negation of the right to seek asylum. 
It is also a questionable use of development aid. Vranckx, Slijper and Isbister (2011) also point out 
that there is an impact on related export licensing decisions as supplying sophisticated and 
integrated border surveillance systems has become important for firms like EADS, who, for 
example, have won the initial contracts for such a system in Saudi Arabia, supported by training 
from the German police. It is suggested that gaining an export licence for such systems is fairly 
straightforward as a relatively small percentage of the technology needs a licence and not much of 
it is military. Vranckx, Slijper and Isbister (2011: 34) argue that licensing sales of “border control 
technology is perceived in many of the licensing countries as supportive to their attempts to control 
migration and influxes of refugees” and thus to support FRONTEX, the EU border control agency, in 
its work. This means that human rights concerns, such as the treatment of migrants and refugees in 
that state, might be deemed less important in licensing decision-making. These are not dilemmas 
unique to the EU. The US is also facing problems reconciling the need to cooperate internationally 
and share technology to meet its homeland security goals, with its preference to operate a 
restrictive export control system (Committee on Homeland Security and Export Controls, 2012). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
I  A European Court of Justice ruling in 2011 banned the use of generalised internet filtering but more targeted activity is still 
taking place. 
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5.5 Summary 
This section has argued that the introduction of export controls on security technologies is going to 
be difficult even after the publicity given to the misuse of surveillance and detection technologies 
during the Arab Spring. It has argued that the concept of security technology is ambiguous and so 
difficult to classify, based frequently on globally available generic technologies and in some cases 
there is no need for control. It also argued that there were few grounds beyond human rights 
concerns for governments and the EU to favour restrictions and arguments in favour of avoiding 
them. It was pointed out that the way the debate was framed was very different to the framing of 
discussions on arms exports, and that this could make it more difficult to draw on those 
frameworks as the basis for legislation. 
The section went on to discuss the existing coverage and the potential for changes / introduction of 
controls in the following frameworks: 
− EU dual-use regime 
− Common Position on arms exports 
− Torture regulation 
− Sanctions / embargos 
− Industry-led initiatives 
While the legal position on the controls of security technologies is undeniably patchy and unclear, 
it seemed that there was no straightforward solution. The major gap emerging from the Arab 
Spring appears to be the lack of controls on exports of surveillance technologies, but the older 
disagreement around export controls on policing equipment means that items used for repression 
such as water cannons and electro shock guns are only controlled if a member state chooses to do 
so nationally. While sanctions offered a short term solution, it appeared that the best way in the 
medium term to control exports was through the dual-use regime. The Torture Regulation offered 
a precedent for a regulation to ban what Wagner (2012b) describes as single-use products whose 
only purpose was repression. 
Finally, the section discussed the external requirements of the EU’s internal security policy 
commitments particularly on transnational crime, counter-terrorism and border management. 
These require cooperation and technology sharing with third countries to be successful. Some of 
these countries do not have good human rights records. The technology needed is the sort of 
surveillance and detection equipment that is prone to misuse. This means that any controls on the 
exports of security technologies could potentially lead to the EU being unable to implement some 
of its internal security plans (whether this is a bad thing is a different question). 
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6 Conclusions 
As Edler and James (2012) argued, the European Commission has acted as a policy entrepreneur in 
opening up a new EU policy field around security industry and technological development. Initially, 
its mandate was unclear and it did not enjoy full support from either industry or member states. 
The interviews carried out for this report showed that although the security research programme 
was a success in many ways, there is a residual discomfort about the Commission’s activism. Edler 
and James (2012) have suggested that the failure to agree on funding defence research in the 
Horizon 2020 research funding programme indicates limits to the Commission’s ability to expand 
their role further. Moreover, the Commission claims that there is no real difference between 
security and defence industry, technologies and user requirements have been questioned by a 
number of reports (including this one), which have suggested that particularly among users’ 
requirements there are still significant differences.  There are though clearly linkages between 
security and defence (or internal and external security) technologies and industries, not least 
because of EU policy actions, which have tried to increase the blurring between the two. One 
under-researched linkage is the question of export controls: the Arab Spring drew public and 
political attention to the inadequacy of controls over EU exports of security technologies. 
The report began by posing the following research questions: 
− How has the concept of security changed in the post Cold War era? And how has this been 
interpreted in the EU? 
− What is the security market? What are the parameters that determine its technologies and 
supply and demand side? Can these be differentiated from the more established defence 
technologies, firms and customers/ users? 
− What are the European policy initiatives in this area and what is driving them? What impact are 
they having on the market? Who are the policy entrepreneurs – the EU institutions or the 
member states? Are the different policy aims coherent?  Is it beneficial or problematic to 
conflate defence and security? What impact do the security industrial and technological issues 
have on other EU policies? 
− Finally, the place of security technologies in the strategic export control system needs analysis. 
Do existing regimes cover security technologies? Should security technologies be controlled? 
What are the ethical issues? 
It is worth briefly reviewing the findings of each section in response to these questions. 
In response to the first group of questions, it is undeniable that the concept of security has changed 
following the end of the Cold War. An academic debate on the concept of security has been picked 
up by policy-makers and the definition of security threats is no longer confined to external military 
threats. One highly important development in this context has been the emergence of the concept 
of homeland security. This US concept has been adopted within the EU as a whole, but most 
particularly within the European Commission’s agenda. Arguably, the emergence of homeland 
security gave the Commission another potential entry point into the security and defence field, 
which member states have preferred to keep intergovernmental. This has led to some unusual 
policy dynamics, whereby it has been in the Commission’s interests to stress the extent of blurring 
between internal and external security needs, suppliers and technologies. 
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The Commission has chosen to define the security market fairly narrowly, concentrating on certain 
types of products thought to be attractive to government customers. This has led to policies that 
critics argue favour defence firms over non-defence suppliers. The report asked whether you could 
still differentiate between defence and security technologies, firms and customers. Both types of 
technologies draw heavily on the same generic civilian technologies and there is a degree of 
overlap, although this can be overstated.  Moreover, even the European Commission (2012a) now 
accepts that the firms researching and producing defence and security technologies are not 
identical. Although the type of security market that the Commission thought would emerge, would 
resemble the defence market, which would favour the defence firms, this has not yet emerged and 
at present there are non-defence firms involved in the security market, particularly in areas like 
telecommunications and surveillance. Additionally, not all defence firms see the security market as 
the most promising area to diversify into, while others have adopted holding strategies rather than 
committing themselves. Thirdly, the report argued that although there were overlaps between 
military and civilian security tasks and thus requirements, there were few signs of a unified 
government customer emerging (not even in the shape of a single national civilian security 
customer). This was because requirements and expectations are not identical, and there was little 
to tempt civilian customers to adopt the military procurement model, which was viewed as 
inefficient. Finally, it was suggested that high profile failures of large security projects in both the 
US and UK, might make other states cautious about embarking on such projects, particularly at a 
time of cuts to government spending. This meant that the demand side was not as strong as the 
Commission had thought. 
Section 4 outlined the current policy initiatives in Europe concerning security and defence industry. 
With the exception of the Franco-British agreements, these were being pursued by the EU 
institutions.  The balance of the evaluation was that the EDA was hampered by having been given a 
near impossible task of reforming the EDITB without sufficient funding or support, while the 
Commission’s policies seemed to vacillate between liberalisation of defence and security trade 
internally and externally, and active industrial policy measures to support industry. The report 
argued though that the Commission’s inability to act as a customer meant that they could not 
manage the sector as effectively as they might like. There are limits to their ability to counter the 
lagging demand in member states for these technologies. The Commission’s entrepreneurial 
approach to policy development was evident by their activism in a number of policy fields, 
particularly border controls that could be linked to security and defence technologies in an effort to 
overcome this. It was also noted that internal security policies seemed to be developing certain 
emphases that did not fit well with the human rights-based approach of EU foreign policy. Similarly, 
the Commission appears to be overly optimistic about the enthusiasm for security technologies 
from the member states and EU citizens. These problems mean that the global export market plays 
a larger role in Commission plans for the security industrial sector than might have been expected. 
Finally, the report considered security technologies and export controls, an issue that had gained 
political salience following media coverage of the misuse of surveillance and detection technologies 
during the Arab Spring. The emergence of these ‘remote’ technologies is arguably the most 
important part of the new security sector, as it is in these technologies that the potential for the 
blurring of internal and external security or security and defence is at its strongest. They also 
constitute the group of technologies that are crucial to the growth of the homeland security state. 
This raises many ethical dilemmas for internal policies, but the report has concentrated on the 
dilemmas they pose to EU external relations. 
The externalisation of the EU’s internal security concerns through the external dimension of the 
Area of Freedom Security and Justice means that policy success in areas such as border control 
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depends on the export of these technologies to neighbouring states. The report argued that this 
inevitably led to difficult ethical problems in finding a balance between concerns about misuse and 
policy effectiveness. These ethical dilemmas were vividly portrayed in the Arab Spring where 
regimes trying to repress protesters misused surveillance technologies sold to them by European 
exporters. 
Turning to the question of controlling the export of security technologies, the report argued that 
this was an issue where an EU consensus would be hard to reach. Some member states share the 
Commission’s view that security technologies should be a growing export market for European 
firms. Others are keener to extend export controls. There is a longstanding division on whether 
policing equipment that could be used for repression and human rights abuse should be controlled, 
which is why such items were not included in the initial Code of Conduct on arms exports, and 
instead a shorter list became the basis for the Torture Regulation. The report noted however, that 
legally there were a number of possibilities for member states to take unilateral action, and that 
some had. The issue is made more complex in that it is not possible to treat all of the technologies 
designated by ESRAB (2006) as security technologies as one group. Some are already covered by 
the military or dual-use lists. Others offer little potential for misuse. The biggest gap appears to be 
around remote or surveillance and detection technologies. 
The report considered the following alternatives for extending export controls to cover these 
security technologies: 
− EU dual-use regime 
− Common Position on arms exports 
− Torture regulation 
− Sanctions / embargos 
− Industry-led initiatives 
It concluded that while this new group of remote technologies also highlights the growing 
complexity of the dual-use regime and how dual-use could and should be interpreted, that this was 
the best medium-term option for control. It also suggested that the Torture Regulation offered a 
model for banning the export of some surveillance technologies that Wagner (2012b) argued could 
only be used for repression. The report found that sanctions and industry-led initiatives were 
unlikely to be robust enough to offer long-term solutions. 
In summary, it can be argued that while the Commission’s starting point was that security and 
defence industry, technology and requirements were essentially interchangeable, this is in fact not 
the case. The Commission’s policy entrepreneurship has enabled it to open up a new policy field 
with speed, but there seems to be a disconnect between the Commission and the member states 
on the question of what technologies are wanted, and a more serious potential gulf between the 
Commission and EU citizens on what security technologies are acceptable. This mirrors the 
situation in the US, and it is hoped that transatlantic lessons can be learnt to avoid wastage of 
scarce resources. The Arab Spring has also reminded the EU that certain gaps were left in its export 
control regime, and that one of them is the control of some types of security technologies. While 
the external needs of the EU internal security policy field are undoubtedly important, the ethical 
issues that they raise cannot be ignored by sensible policymakers. 
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